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THE (F)UTILITY OF RULES:
REGULATING ATTORNEY CONDUCT
IN FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE
Judith A. McMorrow *

The nice thing about standards is that
there are so many of them to choose from.'
"Rules cannot determine the circumstances
'2
of their own application."
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1. This phrase has been described as an oxymoron and social proverb. It is widely
attributed to computer science professor Andrew S. Tanenbaum.
2. This precise articulation comes from Anthony P. Farley, Thirteen Stories, 15
TOURO L. REV. 543, 544 (1999). For a description of the possible sources of this concept
see Frederick Schauer, Prescriptionsin Three Dimensions, 82 IOWA L. REV. 911, 919 n.35
(1997).
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INTRODUCTION

HE problem is often decried: out-of-control attorneys, opportunists, cowboys, self-dealers, and overzealous prosecutors abusing
the litigation process either for self-serving ends or from ideological zeal. But one person's opportunist, cowboy, or self-dealer is another
person's zealous advocate. Lawyers want and need guidance on how to
resolve issues that have competing claims to right behavior. The true
challenge for the legal profession is how to create norms of conduct to
provide this guidance in a rapidly-changing legal culture. 3 Whether
searching for curbs on abusive conduct or reinforcing norms in close
cases, the first cure we look to-of course-is rules. We Americans have
a love affair with rules. Our political and legal rhetoric embraces rules as
the public cure for public problems. Those who toil with rules, however,
3. See Ted Schneyer, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice,44 Aiziz.
L. REv. 521 (2002) ("Although some accounts of the upheaval are exaggerated, American
lawyers and their regulators are unquestionably confronted today with profound and destabilizing changes in legal work, lawyers' workplaces, and the market for legal and lawrelated services."); Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to PrivateJustice: Legal Practiceat
War with the Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 931 (1993); Benjamin H. Barton, An InstitutionalAnalysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. Itl67 (2003). Cf. Arthur R.
Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis,"
and Efficiency Clichds Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 982 (2003) (exploring changes in civil procedure to respond to perceived litigation

explosion).

2005]

The (F) Utility of Rules

know well the limits of rule-making and rule implementation. 4 Rules
have many varied and subtle forms. 5 All rules carry with them the inherent ambiguity of language. Every rule-making context forces us to consider how much, and where, discretion should be given. 6 Yet the softer
version of standards, broader statements that guide the actor, leave many
observers skeptical of their utility. 7 This is particularly true with formal
systems, such as courts, government entities, and corporations, which
tend to gravitate toward rules.8 Rules are also rather crude instruments
to capture ethical values.9
The federal courts have often been held up as the paradigm of a more
coherent rules system. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal
Procedure, and Evidence are designed to increase the probability of a
consistent outcome across state and territorial boundaries. 10 Over the
4. See infra Section III.B. See also Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously:
Broad Ethics Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 77 Tu-. L. REV. 527 (2003); Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the
Lawyer's Point of View, 15 YAt-E J. L. & HUMAN. 209 (2003).
5. See infra Section III.B.
6. See generally Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and the
Conundrum of the Close Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493 (1997); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1990); George P. Fletcher, Some Unwise Reflections About Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269, 277-81 (1984). See also Anthony
V. Alfieri, Critical Theories and Legal Ethics: Inpoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567
(1993).
7. See E. Norman Veazcy, Ethics 2000: Thoughts and Comments on Key Issues of
Professional Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 5 DEL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002) ("Our
objective [in Ethics 2000 revision of Model Rules of Professional Conduct] was also to
resist the temptation to preach aspirationally about 'best practices' or professionalism concepts. Valuable as the profession might find such guidance, sermonizing about best practices would not have-and should not be misperceived as having-a regulatory dimension.
There are other vehicles for accomplishing that noble objective- such as the Conference of
Chief Justices' National Action Plan on Professionalism); Lawrence J. Fox, Setting the Priorities: Ethics Over Expediency, 28 STETSON L. REV. 275 (1998) ("one of the worst things
that ever happened to litigation ethics-no, ethics in general-was the recent emphasis on
professionalism. Beyond good manners and avoiding temper tantrums, no one knows what
professionalism means."); Susan R. Martyn, Professionalism: Behind a Veil of Ignorance,
24 U. TOL. L. REV. 189 (1992) (most professionalism efforts "conclude in hopeful exhortations but weak proposals for change"). Some philosophers use the term "principle" to
distinguish broader concepts from specific, conclusive, and authoritative rules. Others focus on the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive rules. See FREDRICK SCIIAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL

EXAMINATION OF7 RULE-BASED

DECISION-

MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 14-15 (Clarendon Press 1991) [hereinafter PLAYING BY T1E

RULES].
8. Prof. Benjamin Barton offers a very interesting comparative analysis of the institutional strengths and weaknesses of courts, legislatures and the market as regulators of attorney conduct. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation:
Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market, 37 GA. L.
REV. 1167 (2003). Prof. Barton concludes that courts have a critical weakness because they
are too susceptible to lawyer lobbying and insufficiently accessible to the public. He concludes that the least-worst alternative is a legislative body.
9. Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S.CAL. L. REV. 885, 932 (1996) ("whatever advantages codified black letter
rules offer in other settings, they do not obtain when it comes to fostering ethical deliberation in lawyers.").
10. Consistency is an express goal of the Rules Enabling Act, which sets out the procedure by which the rules of federal court practice are enacted. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2000)
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last fifteen years, a new area of rule-ambiguity has emerged as federal
courts have focused on how to regulate attorney conduct in federal court
practice.' The issue is well-known to observers of legal ethics in federal
court practice.' 2 No single set of rules govern attorney conduct (i.e. ethics) in federal court practice. 1 3 Instead some federal district courts use
the state versions of the rules in which they sit, others use the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, or the court's own detailed rules. Even if the district court has
clearly designated which rules apply, the rules are often ignored or irrelevant to the question at hand.
The seeming incoherence of federal court regulation of attorney conduct, at first blush, begs for a resolution through rule-making. Uniform
rules of attorney conduct for federal court practice would, in theory, yield
the traditional benefit of rules: consistently applied norms of attorney
conduct throughout the federal system. Rule-making for attorney conduct in federal court practice, however, has been an utter failure to date,
even as the significant procedural reforms of the 1980s and 1990s saw a
rise in the rule-based sanctions available to federal judges. 14 The
(the standing committee of the Judicial Conference "'shall review each recommendation of
any other committees so appointed and recommend to the Judicial Conference rules of
practice, procedure, and evidence . .. as may be necessary to maintain consistency and
otherwise promote the interest of justice"). For a provocative analysis of the concept of
uniformity see Stephen N. Subrin, FederalRules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989). See also
Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedurefor the Twenty-First Century, 77 NOTRE DAME
L. REV.533, 534 (2002); Thomas 0. Main, ProceduralUniformity and the Exaggerated Role
of Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 315-16 (2001); Carl Tobias, Some
Realism About Federal ProceduralReform, 49 FLA. L. REV. 49, 52-3. (1997) (The Federal
Rules "were meant to promote national uniformity while allowing district judges considerable discretion.").
11. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States undertook an expansive review of local rules in the mid 1980s. See
Daniel R. Coquillette, Report on Local Rules Regulating Attorney Conduct in the Federal
Courts (presented to the meeting of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure on
July 5, 1995). See also Local Rules Project, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States (1987) [hereinafter Local Rules Project]
(analyzing current state of local rules). The subject of attorney regulation was left for
special study, which was undertaken in 1995. This study was updated in JUDITH A. McMORROW & DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, FEDERAL LAW OF AITORNEY CONDUCT, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 802.06 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) [hereinafter FEDERAL LAW OF ATTORNEY CONDUCTF].

12. An excellent body of literature has analyzed the issues. See infra note 57 (articles
analyzing no-contact rule and McDade Amendment). See also Bruce A. Green and Fred
C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381 (2002); Andrew L. Kaufman, Who Should Make the Rules Governing Conduct of Lawyers in Federal
Matters, 75 TUL. L. REV. 149 (2000); Linda S. Mullenix, Multiforum FederalPractice:Ethics
and Erie, 9 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHics 89 (1995).
13. As used in this article, ethics refers to norms of right behavior that derive from the
professional role of the actor. Law, like many professions, has articulated rules of ethical
conduct that are part of the norms of conduct. As described in detail, these professional
rules are not the only source of ethical norms.
14. As Professors Fred Zacharias and Bruce Green have observed, the momentum for
"federal judicial regulation of attorney conduct more generally appear to have petered
out." Green & Zacharias, supra note 12, at 387. For an analysis of the procedural reforms
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strengthening of the sanctions available through the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure has reinforced the understanding of federal courts as an
appropriate body to establish norms of attorney conduct. 15 Yet the federal courts could not develop the needed consensus to adopt federal attorney conduct ethics rules, or even a decision to refer uniformly to the
rules of the state in which the court is sitting.
Those who maintain a national practice, lawyers who are subject to frequent removal of cases from state to federal court, and the Department6
of Justice ("DOJ") are deeply concerned about the inconsistent rules.'
They understandingly do not like the indeterminacy and pockets of internal inconsistency inherent in the situation. 17 While indeterminacy is a
reality for many of their clients, and typically good for business in the
private sector, it is quite uncomfortable, particularly when it carries the
moral censure of "ethical violation." Yet, even the politically powerful
Department of Justice has been unable to muster the necessary political
consensus to create uniform rules, even in the specific areas of particular
DOJ interest.t 8 The DOJ has also repeatedly tried, and failed, to address
this issue through legislation.
Now that the initial issues have percolated through rule-making, congressional, judicial and academic review, we are in a good position to step
back and explore the dynamic that has arisen. There is utility in working
toward coherence in ethical rules in federal court practice, but recent experience suggests that the efforts toward a rule-based system will ultimately be futile. As developed in detail below, multiple cultures and
values come together when we try to regulate attorney conduct in federal
court practice, creating a fascinating, confusing and chimerical situation. 19
that were intended to curb unrestrained adversarialism, Maureen N. Armour, Practice
Makes Perfect: Judicial Discretion and the 1993 Amendments to Ride 1l, 24 HOFSTRA L.

REV. 677, 689-93 (1996). For an excellent development of the rule-based sanctions see
GREGORY P. JOSEPHS, SAN( TIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE (MICIJIE
2000) (1989).
15. A plethora of procedures available to dispose of cases before trial reflected a judicial attitude "increasingly hostile to the preexisting tolerant attitude toward litigants'
claims." Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion:Sanctions and the Conundrum
of the Close Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493, 507 n.63 (1997).
16. See infra Part 11.B. See generally David Hricik & Jae Ellis, Disparities in Legal
Ethical Standards Between State and Federal Judicial Systems: An Analysis and a Critique,
13 GEO. J. LEGAL E-rincs 577 (2000).
17. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal

Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73, 75 (1997) ("Two relatively recent trends, however-the increasingly multijurisdictional character of law practice and the increasingly disparate ethical norms of those jurisdictions-have conspired to put lawyers in the same uncomfortable
position often occupied by their clients."). Prof. Moulton argues that the problems faced
by lawyers "are no more difficult or momentous than similar problems faced much more
often by their clients." Id. at 79.
18. This may be due, in part, to an unstated concern about DOJ capture of the rules
process.

19. Capturing the policy strands of this issue is like holding finely woven threads in
your hand. Each thread seems to float in a different direction, some deeply woven into
other bases. See FiDERAil LAW OF A-IORNEY CONDUI-, supra note II. at § 801.02[71
("The federal law governing attorney conduct may be a relatively narrow field of regulation, but few branches of the law set out so vividly the pros and cons of fundamental
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Federal courts have the inherent power to control the proceedings in
their courtroom, including the long-recognized (albeit conceptually unclear) inherent power to regulate attorneys. In giving content to litigation ethics, judges draw on multiple sources, including the procedural
rules, norms of practice and formal rules of professional conduct. The
state rules of professional conduct were crafted by state supreme courts
for regulatory use, using the model version proposed by the ABA as a
starting point for discussion, and apply to a wide range of settings. Some
of the norms contained in the state and Model Rules of Professional Conduct drew upon influential federal court decisions that crafted the norms
through a common-law process. That common-law process has served
the federal courts quite well. Even when citing to state Rules of Professional Conduct, federal courts often tend to revert back to the commonlaw approach by relying on their own body of federal case law to interpret
the meaning of the text.
The rules of professional conduct in use by states contribute to a common-law, contextualized, approach to regulating attorney conduct in
court practice. The rules of professional conduct do not address many of
the issues that arise in litigation, often contain open-textured standards,
and fail to address the remedy for violations, leaving all of these issues to
judicial discretion. Judges have the wide fact-finding latitude to simply
ignore the attorney conduct issue, which is usually ancillary to the merits
of the litigation. Rules are unlikely to constrain this broad discretion,
particularly among judges who have a strong culture of autonomy and
absolute belief both in their ability to regulate the conduct of attorneys
who appear before them and, perhaps more importantly, their finely
honed ability to exercise discretion. It is, after all, their stock in trade. 20
The federal appeals courts functionally give little review to the exercise of
21
this very broad discretion.
This is not to suggest that rules of professional conduct are irrelevant in
federal court practice. An analysis of the citation patterns of federal
courts reveals a healthy reference to either the state or Model versions of
the rules of professional conduct. But in practice, the rules of professional conduct function like standards, serving to guide the federal courts
but not to unduly constrain their decision-making.
jurisdictional issues[,I including the rival claims of all three branches of federal government
for authority, the rival claims of proactive rulemaking of fixed specificity against the flexi-

bility of retroactive common law' adjudication, and the rival claims of federal and state
jurisdiction.").
20. My thanks to Rev. J.Donald Monan, S.J. for helping develop this idea. See also
Armour, supra note 14, at 686 ("[d]iscretion is not an abstraction to a judge, it is part of her
daily life.")
21. See infra Part III.B.4. In some circuits the written criticism of an attorney in a
written opinion is generally not appealable once the underlying merits have been resolved.
See infra Part III.B.3. See generally John Bell, Discretionary Decision-Making: A Jurisprudential View, in Tm7 UsEs oi DIscR'IuON 89, 94 (Keith Hawkins, ed. 1992) ("Where ...
the reviewing authority will make an alternative decision only in the marginal case where
the original decision is irrational or aberrant, then the original decision-maker is less controlled and has a more authoritative exercise of power.").
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Federal judges do not seem too deeply concerned about the lack of
uniform rules. The federal courts, like all courts, have informal mechanisms to control attorney conduct, a point that requires much more empirical research. 22 In contrast, state courts, with their strong and
historical role in regulating attorneys, care deeply about maintaining control over the rules-the formal processes-governing attorney conduct.
23
States are the initial source of the right to practice law. This first order
power gives state supreme courts, and the courts who report to them, a
role among the multiple institutions that shape the
strong and powerful
24
legal profession.
Lawyers are left with the challenge of anticipating how a court will
react to a particular ethical dilemma. There will be no perfect cure for
the challenge inherent in a federal system. As discussed below, even if
federal courts consistently use state rules of conduct (vertical uniformity),
interpretive differences will arise because the norm creators in this context (the state supreme courts) are not the norm enforcers. Even if federal courts create targeted uniform rules to address recurring issues in
federal court practice (horizontal uniformity), the inherent limit of rules
and absence of appellate review means it is unlikely there will be a national body of case law to give meaning to the rules. What has emerged is
a delicate, ongoing balance of competing interests that is driven by a minimal encroachment approach that acknowledges the state supreme
courts' strong interest but gives room for the autonomy interests of fed25
eral courts.
22. See, e.g., In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86, 92 n.6 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Heavy-handed criticism of an attorney by a judge may exact a considerable price, even when the judge does
not formally frame the criticism as a reprimand."); W. Bradley Wendel, Informal Methods
of Enhancing the Accountability of Lawyers, 54 S.C. L. REv. 967, 976 (2003) ("In the appropriate case, though, a good judicial spanking may be more effective than all the professionalism conferences in the world at educating lawyers about the consequences of
unprofessional conduct."); Paula L. Hannaford, The National Action Plan on Lawyer Conduct: A Role for the Judge in Improving Professionalism in the Legal System, 36 COUR'r
REVIEw 36, 39 (1999) (discussing National Action Plan recommendations that judges take
active role in promoting professionalism, notes that "[niothing acts as a deterrent to unprofessional conduct by lawyers quite as effectively as the watchful supervision of the trial
judge.").
23. United Mine Workers v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967) ("That the
States have broad power to regulate the practice of law is, of course, beyond question.").
24. See Hannaford, supra note 22, at 37 (describing Conference of Chief Justice's National Action on Lawyer Conduct and Professionalism. A plan which "would require more
judicial leadership, coordination and daily involvement to achieve significant improvements in lawyer professionalism and ethical conduct"); Harold C. Clarke, The Judiciary as
the Guardian of Professionalism, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM 65, 67
(ABA, 1997) (while reform of the legal profession in Georgia could occur through law
schools, bar associations, law firms, courts, and individual lawyers, "only one had the
power to invoke the interest and participation of almost all lawyers-the judiciary.").
25. Overall, the debate over federal rules has led to "better questions, rather than new
answers." Timothy P. Terrell, Turmoil at the Normative core of Lawyering: Uncomfortable
Lessons front the "Metaethics" of Legal Ethics, 49 EMORY L.J. 87, 90-01 (2000) (discussing
the nature and irony of ethical disagreement, analyzing how lawyering "is always conducted within a complex combination of philosophical possibilities"). See also Douglas N.
Frenkel, Robert L. Nelson & Austin Sarat, Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of Ethics
and Professionalism, 67 FORDIHAM L. REV. 697 (1998) (major assumption of research pro-
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While the effort to create rules of attorney conduct in federal court
practice did not bear the envisioned fruit of uniform rules, it did bear
some unintended benefits. Since 1995, when the issue was framed, federal courts have moved to embrace dynamic conformity by referring increasingly to the state Rules of Professional Conduct rather than the
Model rules. More lawyers at least know where to look for the (imperfect) standards that will be the starting point for the federal court's analysis. The DOJ has had at least one success in going directly to a state to
lobby for a change in the state ethics rule, indicating that the concededly
labor intensive spot-fix can resolve some of the most critical issues. And
there is still the possibility that in a few recurring situations the federal
courts might be able to fill the gap with more precise rules. It is an open
question, however, whether those targeted ethics rules might better be
placed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Criminal Procedure.
II.

THE PROBLEM AND EFFORTS TO RESOLVE IT
A.

THE PROBLEM IN GREATER DETAIL

Federal courts do not use a uniform set of rules to address attorney
conduct issues. This is particularly surprising given the close affinity between ethics in the litigation context and procedure, both of which address litigation (mis)conduct and often complement and occasionally
supplant each other.2 6 The issue came into national prominence in 1995
when a Judicial Conference study of the rules regulating attorney conduct
in federal courts revealed seven different sources of rules that district
courts are directed to use when evaluating attorney conduct. 27 This range
ject on study of ethical behavior and professionalism "was that neither hortatory professional ideologies nor the promulgation of rules themselves can provide reliable protections
against both incivility and overtly unethical behavior in litigation.").
The analysis in this article is informed, in part, by a pilot study of interviews with judges
to obtain a more thorough picture of how they exercise their discretion in regulating attorney conduct. The pilot study is an access study of federal and state judges. Judges were
interviewed for 45-75 minutes and asked approximately 14 questions. A full description of
the methodology, questions and human subjects' compliance can be obtained from the
author by writing to mcmorrow@bc.edu. For an example of how interviews can be used
see Ray D. Madoff, Lurking in the Shadow: The Unseen Hand of Doctrine in Dispute Resolution, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 161, 167 (2002) (excerpts of interviews "have been added for the
purpose of adding context to, rather than evidence for, the arguments, which will stand or
fall on their own merit.").
26. Procedural and ethics rules have sought to regulate the same corpus of litigation
(mis)conduct, often complementing and occasionally supplanting each other. See generally
Richard G. Johnson, Integrating Legal Ethics and ProfessionalResponsibility with Federal
Rule of Civil ProcedureRule 11, 37 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 819, 823 (2004); Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and FederalizingLawyer Ethics, 1991 BYU L. REV.959 (1991); Richard H.
Underwood, Curbing Litigation Abuses: Judicial Control of Adversary Ethics-The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure,
56 STr. JOHN'S L. REV. 625, 626-29 (1982).
27. Working Papersof the Committee on Rules of Practiceand Procedure:Special Studies of FederalRules Governing Attorney Conduct, (Studies 1,II.-A, Ill, IV, V, VI, Daniel R.
Coquillette; Studies I1B, VII, Marie Leary), Study I at 2-4. (Administrative Office of the
United States Courts 1997), described in detail in FEDERAL LAW O- AI-ORNEY CONDU-r,
supra note 11, at § 802.
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of approaches within the supposedly uniform federal courts occurred because district courts have the power to create local rules to supplement
the federal rules of civil and criminal procedure. 28 The Judicial Conference study was conducted by Professor Daniel R. Coquillette and revealed that of the 94 district courts, 62 courts (about 64%) used a scheme
of dynamic conformity, directing that the district court should use the
rules of the state in which the federal court was sitting. 29 Of those courts,
most had based their state attorney conduct rules on the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (48), but others still used some version of
the earlier ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (12), and two
of the federal District Courts in California used California's rules
adopted by statute. 30 Ten federal courts adopted the ABA models directly. Ten others directed their courts to use both the state standards
31
and the ABA model, even though those standards might conflict.
Eleven district courts had no local rule at all, and the creative Northern
District of Illinois drafted its own rules of conduct that varied in some
respects from both the ABA models and the Illinois standards. 32 District
courts also have a common practice of issuing "standing orders" that govern common issues that arise in the court, and it is unclear whether some
district courts have standing orders that address the issue of attorney conduct. The Coquillette Report noted that updating the research is extremely difficult because "the local rules picture changes monthly and it is
very difficult for loose leaf services to remain accurate."' 33 Even as
34
changes occur, there appears to be "no uniform trend in these changes."
Local rules themselves are a dynamic creature and the mosaic has
changed somewhat since 1995. The fact of identifying the issue may have
encouraged some courts to take action. For example, as of 2001, six more
district courts adopted local rules, leaving only five districts without local
rules governing attorney conduct. 35 Most local rules are now available
on-line.
Even when the local rule is easily found, some rules are badly drafted
or provide "ambiguous guidance. ' 36 More interesting is that even when
the local rule is clear in content, the courts often give only nodding refer28. See Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure For the Twentv-First Century, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 533, 537-38 (2002) (exploring local procedural proliferation).
29. This conformity is "dynamic" because any changes in the professional conduct
rules by the state after adoption of the local rule are automatically applicable in the federal

court.
30. Two of the four federal district courts in California use the unique California Rules
of Professional Conduct, either exclusively or in connection with the ABA models. See
FEDERAL LAW OI- ATTORNEY CONDUCT, supra note 11, at § 802.
3t. Ten use the ABA Models Rules directly, while ten use both the state standards and
the ABA models. Id.
32. Id. §§ 802.04, 802.05.
33. Local Rules Project, supra note 11, at 7.
34. Id.
35. FEDERAL. LAW OF A'I-IORNEY CONDLICr, supra note 11,at § 802.0t.
36. Local Rules Project, supra note 11,at 2.
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ence to the local rule when assessing lawyer conduct, or disregard it. 37 As
Chart I indicates, over the last five years, federal courts have continued to
cite the model version of the rules of ethics in 30-40% of the cases that
cite to the Rules of Professional Conduct. 38 Since 1996, citations to the
model rules have decreased while citations to the state version have increased, indicating that the district courts are moving toward dynamic
conformity. The continued reference to the model version of the rules
offers at least theoretical problems because, as discussed in greater detail
below, many states have changed the model version of the Rules of Professional Conduct when adopting a state ethics code based on the Model
Rules.
Even when a federal court cites to the state version of the ethics rule,
they frequently go on to cite federal court cases that analyze the issue
without regard to whether the underlying citation was interpreting the
same text. For example, in the approximately sixty-four reported federal
cases that refer to Rule 4.2 concerning contact with represented persons,
two-thirds refer to the state version of the rule. Of those, well over half
cited only federal cases to interpret the rule and 90% of the opinions rely
on federal cases to some degree in interpreting the rule. 39 While some
courts do use the local rule to refer to the state code and cite state cases
interpreting the relevant provision, they are the exception. With amazing
candor, the Fifth Circuit has expressly rejected use of a local rule that
applied a state's rules of professional conduct, concluding that the federal
courts should evaluate motions to disqualify based on "the ethical rules
announced by the national profession in light of the public interest and
the litigants' rights."'40 This is arguably what is happening in other circuits
as well, but without a similar express disclaimer of the local rule.

37. Courts may comply with a rule of dynamic conformity by citing directly to the state
rule without feeling a need to refer to the local rule to explain the choice of law.
38. A more thorough analysis of this citation pattern is developed at Chart III, infra.
39. A chart with supporting information is on file with the author.
40. In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1992). The District Court
looked to the local rule, which directed it to use the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 542. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the local rule was not the sole
source of law, concluding that "its local rules alone cannot regulate the parties' rights to
counsel of their choice" because motions to disqualify are "substantive motions." Id. at
543. The court then went on to cite federal conflict of interest cases, the ABA Model Code
and Model Rules, and drafts of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers. Id. at 544-45. See generally Hricik & Ellis, supra note 16.
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CHART I

FEDERAL COURT CITATION TO MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT AND STATE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
FROM

1980-200341

160-

140-

100-

0 Citations to State Rules r Citation to Model Rules

This cacophony of local rules has resulted in a scheme with no horizontal uniformity--anathema to the heart of federal court rule-makers, who
strive to have uniformity among the federal courts-at least consistent
with the boundaries of Erie.4 2 Practitioners who practice in federal courts
in multiple jurisdictions prefer horizontal uniformity. They wish to avoid
different treatment on the same issue, depending on where the litigation
is pending. For example, a law firm is more easily disqualified for conflicts of interest in the Fifth Circuit, which has applied the conflicts rules
rigorously. 43 The same firm that represents a client in the Second Circuit
is less likely to be disqualified because of the more flexible "taint" stan41. This chart reflects citation patterns solely to the Model Rules and state rules that
contain the phrase "Rules of Professional Conduct." All but six states now model their

ethics rules after the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and four of the six use a mix of
the Model Rules and Model Code. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct

§ 01 (2004). We can infer that as states moved to a Model Rules format, the federal courts
increasingly cited the state version of the Rules of Conduct, rather than the model version.
As the chart indicates, in 1991 federal courts began citing the state version of the Rules of
Conduct more often than the model version.
42.

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (t938). The distinction of horizontal and

vertical uniformity is frequently made by those who analyze uniformity of ethics rules. See.
e.g., Mullenix, supra note 12.
43. See, e.g., In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 972 F.2d 540, 541 (5th Cir. 1992).
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dard used by that circuit. 44 The Seventh Circuit appears willing to allow
"screening" to avoid conflicts in situations that would probably not be
45
tolerated in other circuits.
On the other hand, practitioners who are geographically based in one
state, practicing both in state and federal courts within the state, generally
prefer vertical uniformity under which they can be sure that the rules of
conduct applied to them are the same whether practicing in the state
court or the federal court across the street. 46 When a lawyer takes on a
client, the lawyer may not know whether the case will end up in state or
federal court. Even plaintiffs, who can control the initial choice of forum,
are vulnerable to removal. This is a significant possibility, given that between 1999-2003 anywhere from 11-20% of cases in federal court were
lawsuits that were removed from state court. 47
Commentators on this lack of uniformity have provided a rich and valuable critique. 48 This cacophony of approaches arose over the last 30
years. It arguably became labeled as a "problem" when the Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference discovered
it. But the divergent perspectives described above are not equally vocal.
The Department of Justice is a vociferous critic of the current schema.
The tortured history of the DOJ's efforts to bypass the limits of Model
Rule 4.2, limiting contacts with a represented person, have been welldeveloped in the literature. 4 9 The DOJ is deeply concerned that federal
44. See, e.g., Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d 746, 748 (2d Cir. 1981) (focusing
on impairment of the process); Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136, 1140 (2d Cir.
1975) (stating that a judge has an obligation to insure that cases are not tainted by unethical conduct brought to judge's attention).
45. See, e.g., Cromley v. Bd. of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059, 1064-65 (7th Cir. 1994) (screening
allowed to avoid disqualification when attorney who previously represented plaintiff withdrew and joined firm representing defendant). The screening cases may reflect a more
tolerant attitude toward conflicts of interest that are reviewed after resolution of the case
on its merits. In these circumstances, the courts are much more reluctant to require parties
to undergo additional time and expense absent a sense that the conflict called into question
the fairness of the result. See Ted Schneyer, Nostalgia in the Fifth Circuit.-Holding the Line
on Litigation Conflicts Through Federal Common Law, 16 REV. LrriG. 537, 538 (1997).
46. See generallv Hricik & Ellis, supra note 16. Prof. Hricik and Mr. Ellis provide a
detailed analysis of how state and federal courts in Texas have strikingly different standards on several key issues, including treatment of former client conflicts, waiver of conflicts through delay, conflicts that arise from access to non-client confidential information,
and representing interests adverse to current clients. See also David Hricik, Uncertainty,
Confusion, and Despair: Ethics and Large-Firm Practice in Texas, 16 REV. LITIG. 706
(1997).
47. See Admin. Off. U.S. Cts., Judicial Business of The United States Courts Annual
Report 2003, Table S-7, at 34 (2003). This significant variation in removal is due in part to
a sharp increase in asbestos cases that were removed to federal court, many of which were
later returned to state court. Id. at 26. See also 16 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.03
(Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2000).
48. See, e.g., Amy R. Mashburn, A Clockwork Orange Approach to Legal Ethics: A
Conflicts Perspective on the Regulation of Lawyers by Federal Courts, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL
E'rHics 473, 478-98 (1995); Mullinex, supra note 12.
49. See, e.g., Green & Zacharias, supra note 12; Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be
Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 460, 464-67 (1996); Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell,
State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors:The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and
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prosecutors may be subject to sanction under state ethics rules for making
contact with represented persons via undercover agents or through meetings that exclude counsel. 50 The DOJ has skirmished over whether state
ethics rules can limit a federal prosecutor's ability to subpoena defense
counsel. 5' A more recent question has arisen concerning state regulation
of the lawyer's ability to engage in "deceit," or direct their agents in acts
of deceit, such as supervising undercover operations. 52 These three areas
have been the primary subject of what has been characterized as the "ethics wars."

'53

The DOJ's attention to these issues was ratcheted up considerably in
1999 when Congressman Joseph McDade, angry at having been the target
of a DOJ investigation and convinced that the prosecutors had acted unethically, slipped an amendment into an appropriations bill. Known as
the "McDade Amendment," this provision states that a government attorney is subject to state laws and rules and local federal rules governing
Subpoena Rules, 53 U. Prur. L. REV. 291, 294-97 (1992); Note, Uniform Federal Rules of
Attorney Conduct: A Flawed Proposal, I Il HARV. L. REV. 2063 (1998); Ryan E. Mick,
Note, The Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act: Solution or Revolution?, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1251
(2001); John H. Lim, Note, Federal Prosecutors,State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade
Amendment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2080 (2000).
Not recognizing that the review of attorney conduct rules was a subset of a much larger
study of local rules, one student commentator has argued that the Judicial Conference
review of attorney conduct rules is "a smokescreen masking attempts by the Department
of Justice (DOJ) to bypass the no-contact rule." John H. Lim, Note, The Side Effects of a
Legal Ethics Panacea:Revealing a United States' Standing Committee's Proposalto "Standardize" Ethics Rules in The Federal Courts as an Attempt to Undermine the No-Contact
Rule, 13 GEO.J. LEGAL Eniics 547, 548 (2000).
50. Reauthorization of the U.S. Departmentof Justice: Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, Civil Division, Environment and Natural Resources Division, Executive Office for
U.S. Trustees, and Office of the Solicitor General: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
35 (2001) [hereinafter Reauthorization (Civil)] (statement of Mark Calloway, Acting Dir.,
Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice), 42 (statement of Stuart Schiffer,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of-Justice).
51. Stern v. United States Dist. Ct., 214 F.3d 4, 15. 16 (1st Cir. 2000) (local rule requiring judicial preapproval of subpoenas to defense counsel is not applicable to federal prosecutors because it interferes with federal grand jury system).
52. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002). When a lawyer, or a
lawyer's agent, engages in an undercover operation-a common prosecutorial practicethe lawyer is engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
At least one state court decision has stated that these rules do not provide for a
prosecutorial exception, although this conclusion was eventually softened through amendment of the state's version of Rule 4.2. See In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000). In Gatti the
Oregon Supreme Court declined to accept the DOJ's position that the court should create
a prosecutorial exception. Id. at 975-76. ("[flaithful adherence to the wording of DR 1102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(5), ORS 9.527(4), and this court's case law does not permit recognition of an exception for any lawyer to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or false statements. In our view, this court should not create an exception to the rules
by judicial decree.").
53. Edward C. Carter Ill, Limits of Judicial Power: Does The Constitution Bar The
U. L.J. 295
Application of Some Ethics Rules To Executive Branch Attorneys?, 27 S. ILLu.
(2003); see also Nancy J. Moore, intra Professional Warfare Between Prosecutorsand Defense Attorneys: A Plea for an End to the Current Hostilities, 53 U. Pri-r. L. REV. 515
(1992).
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attorneys in the state where the attorney engages in his or her duties. 54
The McDade Amendment has many technical problems-ambiguity being the primary issue-and is a burr in the side of the DOJ. 55 When a
local federal rule clearly designates the state rules of ethics, then at least
the prosecutor knows where to look. But, as noted above, some local
rules refer to both the state rules and the model rules, or adopt their own
rules, leaving the prosecutor subject to potentially conflicting rules. The
issues were sufficiently complex that the Department of Justice created
the Professional Responsibility Advisory Office to answer the McDade
questions of government attorneys and designated an ethics officer in
56
each U.S. Attorney's office in the country.
The McDade Amendment created pockets of confusion for federal
prosecutors primarily in the areas noted above. Members of the Justice
Department dislike the amendment because they feel that it has a chilling
effect on government attorneys by forcing them to constantly put their
law licenses on the line.5 7 Inconsistent bar rules make it hard to determine what rule is to be followed and the different interpretations of the
rules make it hard to determine exactly what conduct is prohibited. 58 As
a result, the DOJ has emphasized to Congress that many government attorneys are afraid to act in many situations for fear of losing their licenses
59
to practice.
Given this steady cry of concern from the DOJ, an obviously powerful
and credible actor in our federal system, it would seem that the situation
would be ripe for swift resolution of this confusion. 60 The cure would
presumably be clear, coherent rules. But this has not happened.

54. Citizens Protection Act (-McDade Amendment"), 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2000). See
generally FEDERAL LAW OF ArORNEY CONDUCT, supra note 11, at § 810.04; Fred C.

Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors,88 GEo. L.J. 207,
215-24 (2000) (analyzing the McDade Amendment).
55. See reauthorization (Civil), supra note 50.

56. Id. at 42
neys, U.S. Dep't
57. Id. at 35
neys, U.S. Dep't

(statement of Mark Calloway, Acting Dir. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorof Justice).
(statement of Mark Calloway, Acting Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Attorof Justice), 42 (statement of Stuart Schiffer, Acting Assistant Attorney

General, Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice); Jesselyn Alicia Radack, The Big Chill: Negative
Effects of the McDade Amendment and the Conflict between Federal Statutes, 14 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 707, 723 (200t).
58. Reauthorization (Civil), supra note 50, at 35-36 (statement of Mark Calloway, Act-

ing Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice), 42 (statement of Stuart
Schiffer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).

59. Eric H. Holder Jr., Ethics Rules and Federal Law Enforcement Officers, TESTI(Mar. 24, 1999), available at 1999 WL
182092 (F.D.C.H.).
60. As discussed later in this article, the DOJ's efforts to create a more predictable
federal court environment for their attorneys might not be achievable. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CI-.-KENT. L. REV. 1569,
1580 (2000) ("people are inclined to make sense of their environments via creative interpretation, reducing the anxiety of uncertainty by imposing artificial and illusory
MONY BEFORE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

coherence.").
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B.

THE FAILED EFFORTS TO CREATE UNIFORM RULES
OF ATTORNEY CONDUCT

After the problem was observed and recorded by the Judicial Conference in 1995, that body explored several possible reforms. Creating a
national code of attorney conduct for all federal courts was proposed as a
theoretical option, but it quickly stalled as overkill. 6t Even assuming that
the federal courts would have such authority to develop a broad-based
code, which has been seriously questioned, there simply was no apparent
political will to do so. 62 Based on the Standing Committee's study of reported cases., the most commonly litigated ethics issues in federal court
practice involved conflicts of interest, contact with represented persons
(Rule 4.2 problems) and advocates as witnesses. 63 A great many issues
covered by state ethics rules are simply not relevant in federal court practice. 64 Taking on the formidable dragon of state chief justices to clean up
a few loose ends seemed an unattractive use of time and ultimately inefficient because the state regulatory apparatus-whatever its flaws-is a superior method of regulating attorneys, particularly for activities that
65
occur outside the litigation context.
The next option of voluntary local rules was quickly rejected as ineffective. Only fifteen of ninety-four districts ever adopted the voluntary
"Federal Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement." 66 Voluntary resolution
was unlikely to yield the desired consistency. The "do nothing" option
was also rejected because of a concern for the "increasing balkanization,"
with little reason to think that the situation would resolve itself over
time. 67 This resistance to local rules on attorney conduct was the next
sign that this problem may be difficult to solve.
61. Zacharias, supra note 12.
62. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate
Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (2003).
63. FEDERAl_ LAW OF A-TORNEY CONDUCT, supra note 11, at § 802.2011].
64. Some rules are designed primarily to protect the client, such as the duty of confidentiality and much of the operation of conflict of interest. Others are designed to protect
the integrity of the fact-finding process, such as the duty not to introduce false testimony.
Others function more like conventions to decrease the chance of later error or misunderstanding. such as putting certain fee agreements in writing and no commingling of client
funds. See generally Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1216 (1994). Yet others appear designed to protect the lawyer
(and future clients of the lawyer), such as the prohibition on limiting future practice of law.
Many of these rule types involve issues that are of primary interest to the bar regulatory
apparatus. For example, the duty to not commingle funds, violations of criminal law and
general neglect are far more likely to be raised in state bar disciplinary hearings than in the
context of litigation in federal court practice. These are rarely, if ever, brought to the
attention of courts during litigation.
65. FEDERAl. LAW OF A7-rORNEY CONDUCr, supra note 11, at § 802.21[11 ("Thus the
'complete' national standard was both theoretically undesirable, in that it entrenched on a
traditional area of state responsibility, and also practically undesirable, in that a 'complete'
set of national rules covered areas of little concern to the federal courts in actual practice,
and made reliance on state disciplinary authorities more difficult."). Cf. Barton, supra
note 3.
66. FEDERAi LAW OF ArORNEY CONDUCr', supra note 11,at § 802.20[l].
67. Id.
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The Standing Committee eventually focused on two options. First, it
could create a local rule of "dynamic conformity" which would require
federal courts to apply the ethics rules of the state in which they sit. The
rule would follow the Rules Enabling Act, assuring national uniformity of
the state preference. 68 Alternatively, the rules process could create
"core" federal rules on the most frequently litigated issues, with
all remaining issues governed by the state rules in which the district court is
located. The Standing Committee considered ten rules, drafted "for discussion purposes only," covering issues such as choice of law, confidentiality, conflicts of interest, candor, advocate as witness and contact with
69
represented persons.
Since the publication of the ten draft rules in 1998, the Standing Committee has not taken further action on the issue of rules of attorney conduct in federal court practice. Over the next four years there was rapid
turnover in the position of DOJ's deputy attorney general, who has oversight over this issue. 70 The Deputy Attorney General under President
George W. Bush had just settled into office when Sept. 11th occurred,
which resulted in a massive refocus of DOJ energies. There did not appear to be the ability to pursue the delicate negotiations needed to balance the many competing interests reflected in the judicial conference
rule-making process. The presence of representatives from the Conference of Chief Justices and, of course, the weight of federal judges kept the
DOJ from exerting dispositive influence on the process. 71
While the rules process limped along, the DOJ repeatedly tried to
overturn the McDade Amendment legislatively, with no success on that
front either. As Assistant Attorney General Stuart Schiffer stated in testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, it was hard to argue
against a rule that says prosecutors "should act ethically in conformance
with rules of ethics."' 72 At least four bills have been introduced to modify
the McDade Amendment, each going down in defeat. 73 Even the pro68. 28 U.S.C. § 2072-74 (2000).
69. FEDERAL LAW OF ArORNEY CONDUCr, supra note 11, at § 802.23[3].
70. Since 1993, Philip B. Heyman, Jamie S. Gorelick, Seth P. Waxman, Eric H. Holder,
Jr., Larry B. Thompson, and James B. Comey, Jr. have all served in the Deputy Attorney
General position. See THE FEDERAL YELLOW BOOK (Summer 1993-Winter 2004). Rapid
turnover creates knowledge gaps that can impair forward movement. Cf. John J. Schroeder, Note, " Duel" Banking System? State Bank Parity Laws: An Examination of Regulatory
Practice, Constitutional Issues, and Philosophical Questions, 36 IND. L. REV. 197, 216
(2003). This is particularly true for the rules process, where it takes approximately three
years to generate a final rule. See FEDERAL LAW OF A-ITORNEY CONDUCr, supra note 11,
at § 801.04 (describing how uniform federal rules are adopted).
71. In the language of public choice theory, despite its powerful base the DOJ was
unable to capture the rules process. Cf. Nancy Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need
for Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 45, 89-93 (1998);
Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalismand the Uniform Laws Process:Some
Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV.83 (1993).
72. Reauthorization (Civil), supra note 50, at 42 (statement of Stuart Schiffer, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
73. See FEI.I?
IRAi LAW OF At-iTORNEY CONDUC-, supra note I1,
at § 810.04[I][dl; Bills
Seek to Alter or Undo Federal Ethics Law Governing Prosecutors, I No. 14 CYIiERCRIMF L.
REi. 2 (2001).
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investigation climate of 2002 was not enough to create sufficient support
for DOJ efforts to overturn the McDade Amendment.74 At each turn,
DOJ bills, or the Coneither the ABA came in to vigorously oppose the
75
ference of Chief Justices lobbied against them.

This issue makes for strange political bedfellows. Those with a strong
belief in state autonomy and states' rights would push for the state supreme courts to retain the dominant role in regulating attorneys while
those with a strong pro-prosecution perspective would presumably support the DOJ. Those concerned with undue influence of the DOJ would
resist resolution by federal legislation because of concern for capture of
the process. The ABA would presumably like to maintain its position as
a dominant leader in the formation of rules of professional conduct,
76
which would lead to resistance to actions that erode their position.
We are left in a state of limbo-with no perceptible movement in addressing the perceived problem of federal court ethics. When we look in
greater detail at the power of federal courts and the interaction between
federal courts and those who create norms of professional conduct, we
can better understand why formal reform has screeched to a halt.
III. THE FUTILITY OF RULES: THE FUNDAMENTAL
COMMON LAW NATURE OF REGULATING ATTORNEY
CONDUCT IN FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE
A.

WHY FEDERAL COURTS INEVITABLY REVERT TO A COMMON LAW
PROCESS TO ADDRESS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
ISSUES IN FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE

1.

Inherent Power of the Federal Courts to Regulate Attorney Conduct

The federal courts have long recognized that they have inherent power
to regulate the conduct of those who appear before them-including the
attorneys. This inherent power was noted early in the 1800s-long before
we thought about ethics codes.7 7 The inherent powers doctrine received
a clarifying boost in 1991 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cham74. Eight days after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, two bills were introduced in the Senate
to loosen the restrictions of the McDade Amendment. The Professional Standards for
Government Attorneys Act of 2001, S. 1437, was introduced by Sen. Patrick Leahy and
directed the Judicial Conference of the United States to create national rules of professional conduct in areas where state ethics rules impede federal investigations. This bill was
sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee and no further action was taken. See Professional
Standards for Gov't Attorney Act of 2001, S. 1437, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1435, 107th
Cong. (2002). Similar provisions were included in earlier drafts of the Patriot Act and
passed the Senate, but were removed after heavy lobbying from the ABA during the conference report. See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. Munigal, Anti-Contact Rule in CriminalInves-

tigations, CRIMINAL

JUSTICE,

16-WTR Crim. Just. 44, 46 (Winter 2001).

75. See Joy, supra note 73, at 46; Leslie J. Hagin, Legislation, CHAMPION, 22-Dec.
Champion 52 (Dec. 1998).
76. See generally Andrew L. Kaufman, Ethics 2000-Some Heretical Thoughts, 2001
Symposium Issue of THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYIER 1.
77. FEDERAL LAW OFI ATTORNEY COND Cr, supra note 11, at § 806.01[3]; Ex parte
Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1824).
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bers v. Nasco.78 The Supreme Court upheld the imposition of attorneys'
fees against the litigant under the court's inherent powers to sanction
bad-faith conduct in litigation. 79 Chambers made clear that courts could
use their inherent power to sanction conduct, even if that conduct was
otherwise covered by the federal rules of civil procedure.8 0 While courts
should "ordinarily" use the procedural rules, Chambers reinforced that
the inherent powers doctrine is extremely flexible and could be wielded
by use of the sound discretion of the district court. 8 1
While the Court has required bad faith before using inherent powers to
shift attorneys fees to the opposing litigant, it is less clear whether bad
faith is required to sanction an attorney.82 Chambers reinforced the wellestablished idea that a court has the power to control admissions to the
bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it.83 The notion of
"supervisory powers"-which functions as a special form or subset
of inherent powers-appears to give courts greater latitude in imposing sanctions on attorneys who appear before the court.- 4 Just as a parent is
quick to infer attitude or intent from words or actions (who among us has
not heard or said the phrase "Don't take that tone with me!"), courts
more readily infer attitude and intent from attorney conduct rather than
litigant conduct. This may largely be a semantic discussion because the
most egregious conduct is likely to draw the strongest sanction. In these
cases, intent can be inferred from objective manifestations of conduct,
just as intent is inferred in both criminal law and intentional torts. 85
The federal courts have cited Chambers extensively over the past ten
78. 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991).

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 48.
See, e.g., United States v. Seltzer, 227 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000), and cases cited

therein; In re Fisherman's Wharf Fillet, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 651, 665 (E.D. Va. 1999) (find-

ing bad faith not required for non-monetary discipline of attorney, but facts justified finding of bad faith); United States v. Claros, 17 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Harlan

with approval, dicta); Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1260 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating, in dicta,
that the finding of bad faith is not required for sanctions under inherent powers; facts
would have justified implied finding of bad faith). But see Resolution Trust Corp. v.

Bright, 6 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 1993) (requiring bad faith in disbarment sanction, quoting
In re Thalheim, 853 F.2d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 1988)).

83. Seltzer, 227 F.2d at 44 (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. at 531) (while this power
ought to be exercised with great caution," it is nevertheless "incidental to all Courts.").
84. The Court in Chambers also noted the non-fee sanctions imposed on the attorneys
involved, including suspension and disbarment, are derived from the court's power to supervise attorneys who appear before it. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43.
85.

DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS § 24 (2000); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL

LAw § 3.5(f) (3d ed. 2000). This greater latitude under the inherent powers doctrine to

sanction attorneys is less clear when evaluating a federal prosecutor's conduct. See United
States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 45-47 (1992); R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a More Independent Grand Jury: Recasting and Enforcing the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory
Evidence, 13 G7o. J. LEGAL EHi-cs 361, 373 (2000) (critiquing Williams): This may flow

from the practical reality that the prosecutor stands at a unique intersection of the litigant
and attorney role. That unique blending may functionally lead courts to require a clearer
finding of bad faith by the prosecutor before imposing sanctions under their inherent powers. See generally Zacharias & Green, supra note 54.
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years.8 6 While Chambers is frequently cited at the end of a string of references, it serves as the exclamation point for the idea that the federal court
is in control. The sheer number of pages courts use to reinforce this idea
of "we're in charge" reflects a sense that the litigation world around them
appears to be out of control. The breadth and flexibility of the inherent
powers doctrine is an acknowledgment that not all aspects of litigation
misconduct can be accurately identified in advance through rule
87
making.
It may be that, as Professors Fred Zacharias and Bruce Green argue,
federal court authority to regulate lawyers is "a practice in search of a
theory."8 8 There are many unresolved questions about "the scope and
nature of judicial authority." 8 9 Lower courts have followed the Supreme
Court's lead and have protected their core ability to regulate the conduct
of both litigants and attorneys through a case-by-case common law approach. Federal courts have constrained their authority at the edges, limiting inherent powers to regulate prosecutors before a grand jury,90 and
disallowing use of inherent powers when it conflicts with substantive
law, 91 or imposes procedural innovations outside the rule-making process, 92 or pierces sovereign immunity. 9 3 These are nibbles on the edges of
the power of federal courts.
The strengthening and clarification of the inherent powers doctrine
emerged as commentators noted a shift in judicial function from deciding
cases to managing them. The concept of "managerial judging" recognizes
the shift in judicial focus from deciding cases on the merits to managing
litigation in an era in which the vast majority of cases settle. 9 4 With a
managerial focus, judges become more concerned with efficiency of the
process. Managerial judging also emphasizes the judge's wide discretion
86. The opinion has been cited approximately 2200 times as of July 15, 2004. Approximately 90% of those citations were made with little or no discussion of Chambers.
87. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46 ("whereas each of the other mechanisms reaches only
certain individuals or conduct, the inherent power extends to a full range of litigation
abuses. At the very least, the inherent power must continue to exist to fill in the interstices."); see generally Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331
(2003) (cognitive jurisprudence and error in rule-making).
88. Zacharias & Green, supra note 62, at 1303.
89. Id. at 1307.
90. Williams, 504 U.S. at 36.
91. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988); United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 727-28 (1980) (finding that courts may not invoke inherent powers to
circumvent harmless error doctrine prescribed by Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)).
92. Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 650 (1960); Stern v. United States Dist. Ct., 214 F.3d
4, 19 (1st Cir. 2000).
93. United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 770 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that despite prosecutor's egregious conduct, the "court's supervisory power, although potent, cannot intrude,
unaided, into the sovereign's protected preserves.").
94. Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of
ManagerialJudging,29 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 41 (1995); E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. Cui. L. REv. 306 (1986); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1982).
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as a manager. 95 The inherent powers doctrine is one of the many tools
available to judges to give vigor to this management role.
2.

Filling in the Content to Create Litigation Ethics

The inherent powers doctrine sets out the court's power, but it does not
articulate any standards or rules. It is a jurisdictional statement, not an
articulation of norms. Because the inherent powers doctrine is designed
to supplement the federal rules, courts are left with a common law process to guide them in using their inherent powers. When applied to attorney conduct, the federal courts do not write on a blank slate. The
scholarly debate over rules of attorney conduct in federal courts has often
been framed as if the ethics rules (Rules of Professional Conduct) are the
dominant source of norms. Ethics rules are important, but are not the
only place to look for litigation ethics. Litigation ethics are supported by
at least four core anchors: the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure and Evidence, the Rules of Professional Conduct, norms of conduct
established by custom or practice within the bar, and expectations framed
by the judges before whom the lawyer is appearing. 96 These sources of
norms all come together to create what can be broadly called "litigation
97
ethics."

Some of the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embody
clear ethical values, such as Rule l's prescription to bring claims well
grounded in fact and law, or a reasonable extension of the same. 98 More
often, the Federal Rules and ethics blend when a lawyer takes action that
falls between procedural rules but has ethical dimensions. For example,
95. See Jonathon T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in
Civil Procedure,84 VA. L. REV. 955, 1003-05 (1998) (arguing that managerial decisions

involve a more expansive discretion than purely legal decisions).
96. Schauer, supra note 2, at 918. See generally H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 10
(1961); PLAYINcG By THE RULES, supra note 7, at 16 (discussing distinction between prescriptive and descriptive rules). While the rules of procedure and evidence, and the Rules
of Professional Conduct both have more typical canonical form than norms established by
custom, practice, or judicial expectation, these latter sources can be a potentially more
significant source of entrenched norms than the formal rules. Id. at 72.
97. It is interesting to note that the phrase "litigation ethics" is rarely used by federal
courts in their published opinions. The idea is more often the focus of scholarly critique.
See generally Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in
Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 873 (1998) (litigation ethics in corporate

litigation "are alive, but perhaps not well"); Eric E. Jorstad, Litigation Ethics: A Niebuh-

rian View of the Adversarial System, 99 YALE L.J. 1089 (1990).
Wonderful articles have probed whether lawyers should have different ethical con-

straints in litigation as opposed to pre-litigation (or "primary conduct") activity. See, e.g.,
Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 261 (1993); David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye,
Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1190-91 (1993); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in

Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (1988). The line between litigation and prelitigation activity is not always clear. Bundy & Elhuage, 92 MICH. L. REV. at 296; Wilkins,
66 S.CAL. L. REV. at 1190-91. This article assumes that standards governing pre-litigation
conduct flow from the anticipated norms to be applied in litigation.

98. See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Reinvigorating Rule 11
Through Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62 Oiuio ST. L.J. 1555 (2001); Judith
A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 BYU L. REV. 959 (1991).

2005]

The (F) Utility of Rules

courts often turn to the language of ethics to evaluate what a lawyer
should do when the lawyer accidentally receives privileged or work product documents from the other side. 99
At least the rules of civil and criminal procedure and evidence and the
Rules of Professional Conduct begin with a text that can be examined
and readily ascertained, even if vague on the topics that most likely raise
ethical issues. At this point in the discussion, two important aspects of
the rules of procedure/evidence and the rules of conduct should be noted.
First, both the rules of procedure/evidence and the rules of conduct have
a variety of self-defining terms that "do little to provide ethical or moral
guidance where it is most acutely needed." 00 The idea of "unreasonable" burdens and "undue" costs under the Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Rules of Professional Conduct, the requirement to act with "reasonable diligence," to keep the client "reasonably informed," to not charge an
"unreasonable" fee, and the like all are areas that require judgment to
define.101
Second, the rules of procedure and rules of conduct derive from quite
different perspectives. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence derive
from a formal rule-making process that is controlled by the federal courts
and Congress.' 0 2 Although interested parties are invited to participate in
the rule-making process, the final rules must be embraced by the judiciary. Ambiguities in the meaning of the rules are clarified by judges who
are armed with a sharp understanding of the burdens and benefits of a
broad interpretation of the rules. 10 3 The rules of procedure and evidence
were created largely by judges for use in litigation.
In contrast, the Rules of Professional Conduct are dominated by lawyers and have been criticized for undue deference to the needs and
desires of attorneys.) ° As discussed below, the Rules of Professional
Conduct were created as the rules for attorney discipline by the bodies
authorized to grant or withhold the license to practice law. Federal
judges are one step removed from this regulatory process and from a presumably more detailed understanding (than the regulators) of the under99. FEDERAL LAW OF AITORNEY CONDUCT, supra note I1, at § 809.0311].
100. W. Bradley Wendel, Rediscovering Discovery Ethics, 79 MARO. L. REV. 895, 896
(1996).
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.3 (2002) (lawyer should act with reasonable diligence and promptness); R. 1.4 (promptly inform and reasonably consul, keep client
reasonably informed); R. 1.5 (prohibits unreasonable fee); R. 1.7 (can represent if lawyer
reasonably believes lawyer will able to provide competent and diligent representation if
other requirements are met), R. 3.7 (lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial at which the
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness).
102. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2073 (2000); Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69, 71-72 (1999) (describing how the
rules of evidence and rules of conduct are the product of different environments).
103. Zacharias, supra note 100.
104. Id.; see also generally Kaufman, supra note 12; Susan R. Martyn, Professionalism:
Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 24 U. ToL. L. REV. 189, 189 (1992) (arguing most professionalism efforts "'conclude in hopeful exhortations but weak proposals for change").
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lying justification for each rule. Federal judges, as experts in rules, would
of course expect attorneys to comply with the rules. But we might expect
those judges to have a greater willingness to examine the justification for
the rule if its application in litigation would yield a less than optimum
result. 105

Norms established by custom or practice and judicial expectation are
harder to capture and analyze. Custom or practice within the bar suggests
the existence of legal communities that can shape conduct. The civility
movement captures this effort to raise the level of custom and practice
within the bar. 10 6 The idea of social norms has received some interesting
attention in legal literature and the work of sociologists is increasingly
influencing our understanding of how social norms affect legal systems. 0 7
Both norms within the bar and a judge's expectation within the courtroom are obviously shaped by a host of complex influences, including
positive law, Rules of Professional Conduct, legal culture, adversarial
paradigm, and the like. 0 8
Judges create norms both through their interpretation of the various
rules (procedure and ethics) and through informal actions. Judges do not
typically question their power to use less formal mechanisms to address
attorney conduct issues. Judges report that their first level response to
questionable conduct-if they decide to act at all-is to talk with the lawyer when an issue arises.' 0 9 It may begin with a simple inquiry, such as
probing the fee arrangement with an attorney or raising a conflict issue.
It may be manifest in pushing counsel on the merits of an issue, or calling
counsel up for a sidebar, or dressing down the lawyer in court. These less
formal mechanisms are not dependent on a specific rule but they can
have powerful norm-setting effects within a courtroom.t 0 Because the
judge has enormous discretionary power to shape the case, the lawyers
105.

PLAYING BY THE RuLEs, supra note 7, at 73-76 (discussing layering of rules).
106. See generally Marvin E. Aspen, A Response to the Civility Naysayers, 28 STETSON
L. REV. 253 (1998).
107. See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUo. 585 (1998);
Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 38-43
(2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914-21
(1996); Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the
Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV 875, 894-99 (2002); Kristin
Madison, Book Note, Gov't Signaling and Social Norms, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 867, 867-72
(2001) (reviewing Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (2000)).
108. PLAYING 1Y THE RULES, supra note 7, at 102 ("many of the acts I would now not

think of performing are acts that became unthinkable for me by a process of socialization
that is itself substantially determined by regulative rules"). Cf. Geoffrey P. Miller, Norms
and Interests, 32 HOIFSTRA L. REV. 637, 673 (2003) ("Competitive norms often do not represent an idealized product of spontaneous social ordering. They serve the interests of
particular groups.").
L.

109. See, e.g., Claudia Rickert Isom, Professionalismand Litigation Ethics, 28 STEI SON
REV. 323, 324 (1998) (reporting that at Florida Conference of Circuit Court judges edu-

cational seminar, most common response to videos of unprofessional and unethical conduct "was to do nothing or to privately counsel the offending attorney.").
110. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Critical Theories and Legal Ethics: Impoverished
Practices, 81 Gio. L. 2567, 2591 (1993) (noting "the relative stability of legal discourse,

institutions, and relations.").
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have powerful incentive to stay on the good side of the judge. While
t
some lawyers will proceed to defy and annoy the judge," I anecdotal evidence suggests that in the face of clear signals from a judge most lawyers
will alter their behavior.
Conspicuously absent from the list of anchors for litigation ethics is
substantive law. Over time, some conduct that had previously been conceptualized as an ethical issue has been absorbed into substantive law.
For example, twenty years ago there was a serious ethical question about
whether prosecutors could threaten criminal charges to obtain an advantage in a civil case. In 1987, the Supreme Court issued an opinion concluding that as a matter of statutory interpretation it was appropriate
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 to condition a dismissal of criminal charges
not pursue a civil claim (known as
on an agreement that the defendant
"release-dismissal" agreements). 1 2 Once the federal courts framed the
issue in that way, subsequent cases were much less likely to treat the
question as an ethical issue because it had become subsumed into the
substantive law.'1 3 Similarly, some poignant and disturbing acts by defense counsel in criminal cases are not treated as ethics issues, but subsumed in the substantive question of whether the conduct meets the
1 4
A reconstitutional requirements for ineffective assistance of counsel.
lated phenomenon occurs in the development of the attorney-client privilege. Federal courts are allowed to create a federal common law for
privileges under the Federal Rules of Evidence, except where state law

S11.See, e.g., Interview with Federal District Court Judge:
"I remember prosecuting a case, a very significant drug conspiracy, and with some lawyers
from-who are well known drug lawyers. And they were antagonizing the judge to the
point where the judge was losing his temper. They would make arguments that were just
absurd. The judge was screaming at them and I remember talking to the lawyer at a break
and said "Why are you doing this? This isn't going to help, the judge clearly despises you,"
and he said "when you've been in the business long enough. you'll understand it doesn't
matter what the judge thinks it's what my client thinks. And he's happy that I'm giving the
judge hell and he's going to tell all his friends that I gave that judge hell and I'm going to
get a lot of business out of this." There was a very frank statement that someone made.
They won't often be quite so obvious about it. There are times when I think people want a
pit-bull, they want a gladiator and there are all too many lawyers who are willing to serve
that function for them if the pay is right." [03-FD]
112. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). See generally Michael E.
Solimine, Enforcement and Interpretationof Settlements of Federal Civil Rights Actions, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 295 (1988); Judith A. McMorrow, Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling
Private Rights of Action, 34 VILL. L. REV. 429 (1989); FEDERAL LAW OF ATTORNEY CONDUCIt, supra note 11, § 813.06.
1 3. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2002) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case shall ... refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause"). The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was more
explicit, stating that "A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to
present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter." Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, DR 7-105(A) (2004).
As described infra § Il(A)(3), U.S. Supreme Court cases did influence the ethical and
professional vision reflected in the Model Code.
114. See FEDERAL LAw OF.ATFIORNEY CONDt _CT,supra note 11, at §§ 811.04, 813.01.
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provides the rule of decision. 11 5 This provides the textual basis for the
development of common law on the attorney-client privilege, which is
informed, but not constrained, by the state-articulated duties of confidentiality. 16 Federal courts typically ignore the duty of confidentiality when
articulating the scope of the attorney-client privilege.' 17 Once the ethical
dimensions of the conduct have been subsumed into the substantive law,
the state ethics codes (and the ABA models) become largely irrelevant.
Courts typically do not undertake a formal analysis to explain why they
are ignoring state ethics rules, but the supremacy clause would dictate
that substantive federal law would prevail over countervailing state law.
Any of these four sources of norms for litigation ethics-procedural/
evidentiary rules, Rules of Professional Conduct, norms and judicial expectations-can have the label "ethics" attached, although it is most commonly attached to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics is a
weighted word. Once the label "unethical" is attached, only the clearest
countervailing ethical norm, or unequivocal law or procedural rule, will
trump." 8 (And we would expect some linguistic hand-wringing about the
conflict between law and ethics.) Even if there is a clear and contrary
positive law that compels unethical conduct, common morality may push
the lawyer to exhibit what William Simon has called "moral pluck" and
do what is ethical. t1 9
3. Federal Court Influence on State Ethics Rules: The Dialectic Process
So we have a broad, inchoate inherent power to regulate the conduct of
attorneys. The norms applied through inherent powers-"litigation ethics"-emerge from multiple sources. While the Rules of Professional
Conduct are very important, they are not the only source of norms. Even
if we wanted the Rules of Professional Conduct to take a dominant place
in framing litigation ethics, as currently framed, they are not up to the
task. Because of the general standards contained in the rules, timing of
their implementation, jurisdictional issues, and subtly different needs of
the federal courts, the state standards are incapable of functioning with
strong constraining force.
115. Fi~n. R. EVID. 501 (privilege questions in federal court "shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience" except where state law provides the rule of decision).
116. See Zacharias, supra note to, at 71-72.
117. These two doctrines are grounded in different policy concerns. I have no quarrels
with keeping these concepts separate. My query is why the ethical dimensions of confidentiality largely disappear when attorney client privilege issues come up, rather than serving

as an important complementary doctrine.
118. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 919 ("The weight of a prescription is, thus, the measure of its ability to prevail against opposing prescriptions, regardless of the source of those

prescriptions."); Abbe Smith, "Nice Work If You Can Get It": "Ethical" Jury Selection in
Criminal Defense, 67 FORDAM L. REV. 523, 565-66 (1998) (arguing that ethic of zealous
defense should trump the ideal of racially blind jury selection); Susan P. Koniak, The Law
Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389, 1422-27 (1992).
119. William H. Simon, Moral Pluck: Legal Ethics in Popular Culture, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 421 (2001).
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In terms of hierarchy, the ethics rules (i.e. Rules of Professional Conduct in most states) would be the primary rules to examine when confronted with an issue of litigation ethics that is not otherwise addressed in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or other substantive law. To understand why the Rules have limited constraining force in federal court, we
need to understand the development of these rules. The history of the
efforts to set standards and rules for the legal profession is fairly recent
and familiar to many. The 1908 Canons of Ethics was a precatory code
drafted by the ABA and not tied to licensing requirements when initially
drafted. 120 The Canons of Ethics were occasionally cited by federal
courts to chide lawyers. 12' In a handful of areas, the Canons appear to
have influenced the common law practice in federal courts.t22
The ABA's 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility was
promulgated and sent to the states for incorporation into the states' licensing scheme. The Model Code included many footnote citations to a
plethora of ABA opinions along with multiple state and some federal
court cases that influenced or explained the policy choices reflected in the
Model Code. Federal cases, including Supreme Court cases interpreting
constitutional doctrine, had an influence in the development of the Canon 4 duty to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client, 123 the Canon 5 duty to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a
client, 124 the Canon 7 duty to represent a client zealously within the

120. CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAl E'riics § 2.6.2 (West 1986). The Canons
were later adopted by some state bar associations as the basis of discipline. Id.
121. See, e.g., T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268
n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (adopting the Canons of Ethics by Rule of Court).
122. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Freeman, 409 F.2d 427, 428 (7th Cir. 1969) (calling them
'code of ethics," opinion relies of Canons 13 and 34 to support division of fees).
123. See Ellis-Foster Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 159 F. Supp 917, 919
(D.N.J. t958) (cited in MODEl CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (2002)): Baird v.
Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960) (cited in MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBurY EC 4-1 (2002)).

124. See Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949, 952 (E.D. Va. 1959), modified, United States
ex rel Wilkins v. Banmiler, 205 F. Supp. 123, 128 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1962), affd 325 F.2d 514 (3d
Cir. 1963) (cited in MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrFY EC 5-1 (2002)); United

States v. Anonymous, 215 F. Supp. 11I,113 (E.D. Tenn. 1963 (cited in MODEL CODE OF
PROF*L RESPONSIBIIrry EC 5-2 (2002)); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942)

(cited in MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSinsLrrY EC 5-16 (2002)): State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co. v. Walker, 382 F.2d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 1967) (cited in MoDEL CODE OF PROF'L
R-SPONSimnlTy EC 5-17 (2002), interpreting duty of Indiana attorney); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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bounds of the law, 2 5 duties of candor to the court, 126 and public criticism
27
of judges.1
The Model Code was adopted essentially verbatim in most jurisdictions. It was drafted under a comparatively more inclusive process than
the Canons of Ethics, but was still subject to criticism as reflecting a narrow vision of lawyering.12 8 The Model Code was quickly acknowledged
by federal courts, and as Chart II indicates, by the mid-1980s reached its
peak of influence as the courts crafted norms of litigation conduct. Although this Code was only a "model," federal courts could safely cite to
the model and assume it reflected state versions (to the extent the court
thought about that concern at all). The ABA Model Code became a
handy reference point for the courts. The ABA proudly features its influence in this area.t29
The Model Code's flaws were many, not least of which was the fact that
many critical issues were not addressed by the Model Code. 130 One significant example was the conflict of interest obligation owed to former
clients. Because the Model Code was silent on this issue, the federal
courts who addressed former client conflicts wrote largely on a blank
slate. Drawing on analytical constructs developed before the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility was even adopted by the ABA in 1969, the
federal courts continued to do what they had done in the past when confronted with issues that needed resolution. They created a common law,
125. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (cited in MODEL CODE OF PROF'IL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (2002)); Johns, 176 F. Supp. at 952 (cited in MODEL COoE OF PROF*L
RESPONSInuLIY EC 7-1 (2002)); Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390 (1930) (cited
in MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESIONSIBILrry EC 7-2 (2002)); McCartney v. United States,
343 F.2d 471, 472 (9th Cir. 1965) (cited in MODEL COE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrY EC7-4
(2002)); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (cited in MODEL CODi- OF PROF'L
REsPONSIBIIrry EC 7-4 (2002)); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (cited in
MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7-13 (2002)); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333,363 (1966) (cited in MODEL CoDE OF PROF'L R1-SPONSIBILrrY EC 7-33 (2002) and
pretrial publicity); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (cited in MODEL CODiF OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY EC 7-33 (2002)); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)

(cited in MODE-L CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSmH.ITY EC 7-33 (2002)); Marshall v. United
States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) (cited in MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILiTY EC

7-33 (2002)).
126. Precision Inst. Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co. 324 U.S. 806 (1945) (DR 7102(B)(2) on duty to promptly reveal fraud on a tribunal committed by person other than
the client to the tribunal); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1944): Colton v.
United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962) (on DR 7-106(B)(2) disclosure of identity of
client).
127. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
128. WOURAM, supra note 120, at § 2.6.2 n.21 (noting that the ABA Committee largely
copied from 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 118, at § 2.6.3 (describing drafting and adoption process for Model Code).
129. The ABA has featured its role in crafting the lawyer Codes and Rules. See ABA
Center for Professional Responsibility, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/home.html (accessed
August 3, 2004) ("Center has provided national leadership and vision in developing and
interpreting standards and scholarly resources in legal ethics, professional regulation, professionalism and client protection mechanisms").
130. WOLFRAM, supra note 120, at § 2.6.4 (describing critiques of the 1969 Code).
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framing the issues largely unconstrained by formal rules. 13 1 Similarly, the
Model Code failed to develop in detail the particular duties of govern32
ment attorneys, a subject which had been left to the courts to develop.
In other words, the Model Code did not arrive on the scene in 1969 as
an intact body of rules applied to the federal courts, but rather as standards and rules reflecting the legal culture and informed by the federal
court's common law and constitutional decision-making. The gaps in the
Model Code, its express application to the disciplinary process (a subject
discussed in greater detail below) and its often broad pronouncements
made it function in the federal courts largely as a body of advisory
standards.
The ABA soon went back to the drawing board and produced and
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983. The Model
Rules did not contain a footnote trail to indicate directly what influenced
the various rules. We know from the content of the rules and the slender
131. See T.C. Theatre Corp., 113 F. Supp. at 268-69. Although T.C. Theatre was issued
long before the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the Model Code did not give
specific attention to the duties owed to former clients. As a result, the federal common law
developed from T.C. Theatre and its progeny was highly influential. See MODi-i RULtES OI
PROF'L RFSPONSrBILr'Y R. 1.9 (1983) (adopting the substantial relationship test of T.C.
Theatre).
132. T.C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 268-69.
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legislative history that many federal court decisions were highly influential in the drafting of the Model Rules. For example, the federal cases
setting out the "substantial relationship test" as the analytical construct
for evaluating duties to former clients appears to be the basis for the substantial relationship test of Model Rule 1.9. t3 3 Similarly, federal cases
involving special conflicts of interest for former and current government
officers and employees appear to have been highly influential in the development of Model Rule 1.11, including the authorization of screen1 35
ing. 1 34 These cases in turn were often influenced by ABA Opinions.
The point is not that we can tie down a dispositive influence, but that a
dialectic process occurred where the multiple institutional actors had varying degrees of influence upon each other.
By the mid-1980s, the federal courts were now well into the habit of
citing the "Model" version of the ABA promulgations on attorney conduct. Although the Model Rules were sent to the states, the deference to
the ABA-and consequently the perceived unity of vision-had begun to
fray. States were much more likely to modify the Model Rules than the
previous Model Code, with 44 states modifying the Model Rules in some
significant respect before adopting them. 136 It appears that the longer
states waited to revise their older code and move to a Model Rules type
37
of system, the more they would revise the ABA version.'
But citation habits had been set. Federal courts often cited to the
model version, using the model as a guide where relevant, when developing the court's common law doctrines. The federal courts often failed to
recognize the increasing divergence between the state and model versions
of the attorney conduct rules.
Meanwhile, the proliferation of local rules meant that somewhere in
this time frame the federal district courts were likely adopting a local rule
that identified the rules they would apply when evaluating attorney conduct. The local court rules that were drafted earlier are more likely to
refer directly to the Model Code or Model Rules. 138 Later rules might
adopt the rules of the state in which the court sits-but may not be clear
that they are adopting "dynamic conformity" to capture revisions in the
state rules that occur after adoption of the local rule. 1 39 The federal
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. New York City, 501 F.2d 639, 650-52 (2d Cir. 1974),

cited in ABA/BNA

LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

at 91:4007; Arm-

strong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445 (2d Cir. 1980); Kesselhaut v. United States. 555 F.2d
791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Lake County, 703 F.2d 252, 255-56 (7th Cir.

1983).
135. See, e.g., Gen. Motors, 501 F.2d at 648-49 (quoting ABA Comm. On Prof'l Ethics
and Grievances, Formal op. 37 (1931)).
136. Charlotte (Becky) Stretch, Overview of Ethics 2000 Commission and Report, at
http://www.abanct.org/cpr/ethics2k.html) (accessed Aug. 2, 2002).

137. See Kaufman, supra note 12, at 157.
138. See, e.g., Local Rules of Civ. Prac. & Proc. U.S.D. Ct. D. Del. 83.6(d)(2) (effective
Jan. 1,1995) (refers to Model Rules).

139. See, e.g., Local Rules of U.S.D. Ct. D.C. 83.15 (effective Sept. 1,2003) ("Violations
of the Rules of Professional Conduct (as adopted by the District of Columbia Court of

The (F)Utility of Rules

2005]

courts did not have any process of periodic review and revision of any
local rules. Consequently, for some courts the local rules became outrules are so
dated after the Model Rules were issued. But since the local
140
easily ignored, the situation was a tolerable anachronism.
At the same time there was a proliferation of local rules, federal courts
also experienced a sharp increase in the other procedural tools to regulate attorney conduct. 14t The 1983 and 1993 revisions of Rule 11 gave
federal courts clearer power to impose sanctions for frivolous litigation.142 This led to thousands of published federal court opinions on what
various courts believed constituted a position well grounded in fact or law
(or a reasonable extension of law), giving sharper articulation of an issue
that had rarely been addressed by state regulatory bodies.1 43 The trend
in amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to grant federal
judges greater power to regulate attorney conduct under Rules 16 (settlement), 26(g)(3) (discovery) and 37 (compliance with court orders). The
same trend of expanded procedural rules appears in both the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court. 144 Other statutory bases for imposing
145
sanctions encourage judges to take an active role in regulating conduct.
With this broad arsenal of sanctions available, ethics and professional
conduct rules serve largely to supplement gaps in the procedural rules
and to provide ideas and justifications for the court's imposition of its
catch-all power: the inherent power doctrine.

Appeals except as otherwise provided by specific Rules of this Court) by attorneys subject
to these Rules shall be grounds for discipline, whether or not the act or omission occurred
in the course of an attorney-client relationship"); Local Rules of U.S.D. Ct. Ma. (including
amendments through Jan. 2. 2001), 83.6(4)(b) (violation of ethical requirements and rules
adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts "as they may be amended from
time to time by said court" constitute misconduct).
140. The role of local rules the federal litigation system has received extensive attention
over the last 15 years. See generally Judith Resnick, Changing Practices, Changing Rules:
Judicialand CongressionalRulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49
ALA. L. REV. 133, 168-71 (1997) (describing growth in local rules); Stephen B. Burbank,
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1043-98 (1982) (describing history of Rules Enabling Act). The Federal Judicial Conference became so concerned about
the proliferation of local rules addressing all subjects that it embarked on the Local Rules

Project. See

FEDERAL LAW OF ATTORNEY CONDUCr,

supra note 11, at § 801.05[4).

141. This rise in the regulatory tools available to courts reflects the increasing regulation of attorneys in the second half of the 20th century. See Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a
History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics-I. Origins, 8 U. Ciii. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE

469 (2001).

142. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1H.
143. See Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Legal Ethics, 1991 BYU L.
REV.

959 (1991).

144. See Fed. R. App. P. 38 (authorizing award of costs, including attorneys fees, for
taking frivolous appeal); Fed. R. App. P. 46(b), (c) (governing suspension, disbarment, or
other discipline of member of bar.); S. Ct. R. 8 (governing disbarment or other discipline of
member of bar); S. Ct. R. 42.2 (authorizing sanctions for frivolous appeal).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1912, 1927 (2000).
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The Incompleteness of State Rules and the Remedy-Driven Federal
Courts

Habit was not the only impediment to adopting the state versions of
the Model Code or Model Rules in federal court practice. Even the
somewhat more tightly drawn Model Rules failed to address many specific problems that arise in federal court practice.t 46 For example, the
Model Rules do not tell lawyers or courts what professional relationships
trigger a duty to avoid conflicts of interest, 147 whether a disqualified lawyer can turn over predisqualification work-product, 48 ethical dimensions
of how to behave when the opposing side accidentally sends confidential
documents, 149 whether prosecutors have greater latitude to make contact
with represented persons, 150 and a host of other large and small
questions.
The Model Rules also set out provisions intended to be applied in a
wide range of litigation and non-litigation contexts. As a result, the underlying rules require contextual definition. For example, the most commonly-litigated ethics issue in federal court practice is conflict of interest.
The text of Model Rule 1.7(a) states that a lawyer may not represent the
client if "the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client" or there is a significant risk that the representation "may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, or to a
third person, or by the lawyers own interests." 1'5 While the comments to
the rule give insights into what these terms mean, they understandably
are never formally defined. 152 Federal courts crafted standards under the
Model Code based on common factual situations, such as suing one's own
client, and have continued to rely on this jurisprudence to give meaning
to ideas such as "directly adverse" and "materially limited" under the
Rules. 15 3 Federal courts have had to consider the special problem of simultaneous representation that occurs from client mergers or acquisitions
and from corporate affiliates and subsidiaries. 154 The courts develop
their own jurisprudence to address these more complex factual scenarios.
146. In other words, the divergence between the Model Rules and state versions was
irrelevant in many circumstances because so many of the ethical issues that arise in federal
court practice are not clearly addressed in the Model Rules or Model Code.
147. FED1RAL LAW OF ATrORNFY CONDUCT, supra note 11, at § 808.03.

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at § 808.07.
Id. at § 809.03.
Id. at § 810.03.
MODEL RULES OiF

152. See

PROF'L

CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1)-(2) (2002).

SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL

58 n.5 (University of Michigan Press 2002) ("Though adversity is the cornerstone of conflict of interest, the ethical rules never operationally define adversity nor specify its dimensions. Instead, the rules leave to lawyer interpretation whether a
representation will adversely affect another." Ms. Shapiro notes that the Ethics 2000
amendments to the Model Rules reflect "a bit more on the nature of adversity than did the
PRACTICE

original" Model Rules.)
153. See, e.g., Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (2d Cir. 1976).
154. FIEIRAi LAW OF' Ari-roRNEY CONDUCT, supra note 11, at § 808.03[41 and [5]. See
generally Ronald D. Rotunda, Conflicts Problems When Representing Members of Corporate Families, 72 Noriu DAME L. REV. 655 (1997).
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These are problems that require particularistic decision-making, with the
Rules of Professional Conduct giving the appearance of rules but func55
tionally serving as less-constraining standards.
In applying rules of conduct, the federal courts seldom struggle with
the intent behind the rule. That analysis would require a focus on the
drafter. Instead, courts typically focus on the value that the rule supports. 156 By shifting the focus from intent, which is more akin to factfinding, to value exploration, the analytical process allows the decisionmaker's own assessment of the values to play a greater role.
More importantly, the Model Rules and Model Code (and the state
versions) are expressly silent about remedies and sanctions. Litigation is
largely a remedy-driven system, and attorney conduct issues are particularly so. In most cases, the claimed violation of ethical obligations is
raised by opposing counsel, who is motivated to do so not just by some
abstract desire to improve the legal profession, but rather to get a concrete remedy, such as disqualification of opposing counsel, limitation or
exclusion of evidence, an order of production, reimbursement of fees,
civil or criminal contempt, and the like.t 57 The moving lawyer's motivation might be a desire to expose errant conduct to the court to set a tone
for the litigation. It is no coincidence that the three most litigated ethical
issues in federal court practice-conflicts of interest, contact with represented persons, and advocate-witness concerns-all offer tactical advan58
tages to the moving party if the court awards the requested remedy.
The judges are obviously concerned about their institutional role in
crafting a remedy. Since attorney conduct issues are largely derivative in
court practice, secondary to the fair resolution of the litigants' claims, the
federal courts appear reluctant to address attorney conduct issues unless
they will have a consequence in the case at hand. 159 A detailed analysis
of the reported decisions indicates that federal judges, like their state
counterparts, are concerned with the integrity of the judicial process and
the efficiency and fairness in the proceeding before the court. Concern
for the integrity of the legal profession as an independent concern, at
60
least as reflected in the reported decisions, plays a less dominant role.'
Because of the remedy-driven nature of the courts, and the federal
court's reluctance to take on a dominant role in maintaining the integrity
of the legal profession, the federal judges are rightly concerned that they
155. PLAYING BY THE RULIS, supra note 7, at 77-78.
156.

Id. at 95 (discussing the substantive justification for a rule).

157. See generally FEDERAl. LAW OF A-ITORNEY CONDUCr, supra note 1I, at § 808.02[21
(describing remedies for conflicts of interest); § 809.06 (describing remedies given by federal courts for unethical conduct in civil discovery).
158. Daniel R. Coquillette, Study of Recent Federal Cases (1990-1995) Involving Rules
of Attorney Conduct at 2-3 (Dec. 1, 1995) (presented at meeting of the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of federal Judicial Conference).
159. See Judith A. McMorrow. Jackie A. Gardina & Salvatore Ricciardone, Judicial
Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View From the Reported Decisions,
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425 (2004).
160. Id.
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do not want ethics issues to be used for strategic advantage. 16 t The inevitability of strategic use of ethical rules has been well noted elsewhere. 162
And the line between fairly raising an issue, and undue strategic advantage, is very opaque. Some courts have asserted that lawyers have a duty
to report ethical issues, such as conflict of interest, to the court. 163 But
other courts are clearly concerned about the use of misconduct charges
for strategic advantage. In an effort to avoid having ethics used as a litigation tactic, federal courts may look to the timing of the motion to infer
undue strategic motives, 16 4 to the amount of pre-trial preparation or to
the relative wealth of the parties to infer that the motion is to harass or
increase expenses to the opposing side. 16 5 Courts may also examine the
circumstances to determine if the motion is designed to delay the proceeding or postpone judgment. 166 In the end, a court's evaluation requires a delicate balancing of competing equities, including a desire not
to lightly deprive a litigant of his or her counsel of choice.' 67 At this
point, a court is balancing a host of competing concerns that are often not
reflected in the text of any state or model professional conduct rule, but
are part of the mosaic of common law interpretation.
Not only are both the Model Code and Model Rules silent on sanctions, but they ostensibly sought to limit their application to the regulatory context. The Preamble to the 1983 Model Rules expressly states that
the "rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are
not designed to be a basis for civil liability." t 68 During the editing and
161. See FEDERAL LAW OF A'I-rORNEY CONDUCIT, supra note 11, at § 808.01[51 (setting
out federal court concerns about strategic uses of conflicts motions). See also SiIAPmmO,
supra note 152, at 425-26 (describing strategic uses of motion to disqualify). The problem
of strategic use of ethics rules for competitive advantage is not unique to litigation. See
generally Linda Galler, Problems in Defining and Controllingthe UnauthorizedPractice of
Law, 44 ARIZ. L. Ri v. 773 (2002).
162. See Wilkins, supra note 6.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Clarkson, 567 F.2d 270, 272 n.1 (4th Cir. 1977); Estate
Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
164. See, e.g., Kabi Pharmacia AB v. Alcon Surgical, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 957, 964 (D. Del.
1992); Research Corp. Techs. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 936 F. Supp. 697, 701-02 (D. Ariz.
1996); Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 847 F.2d 725, 731 (11 th Cir. 1988) (delaying in
bringing motion basis for denial of motion to disqualify). See also Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 71, 116 (1996).
165. Research Corp., 936 F. Supp. at 701, 703 ("Disqualification can result in increased
expenses .... ); SWS Fin. Fund A v. Salomon Bros., Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1392, 1400 (N.D. Ill.
1992) ("The sanction of disqualification foists substantial costs upon innocent third parties."); Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 848 (1st Cir. 1984) ("We are aware that disqualification motions can be tactical in nature, designed to harass opposing counsel.").
166. See, e.g., Research Corp., 936 F. Supp. at 701 (Disqualification "can result in increased expenses, delay in resolution of the proceedings and deprivation of choice of counsel."); Parkinson v. Phonex Corp., 857 F. Supp. 1474, 1476 (D. Utah 1994) (Wholesale filing
of motions would result in "needless disruption and delay of litigation, thereby impairing
the efficient administration of justice.") (citing Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 438
(2d Cir. 1980)).
167. See, e.g., Kevlik, 724 F.2d at 848 (strategic concerns not dispositive in evaluating
motion to disqualify).
168. MODiEL RUi.iFS O1 PROF'! CONDUw'-,

Scope (2002).
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public comment process for the 1983 Rules, the "Scope" discussion was
limited at the suggestion of the New York State Bar Association to include a sentence that "nothing in the Rules should be deemed to augment
any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary conse169
quences of violating such a duty."
Whatever the model version might say, the ABA could not control how
those rules would be used. If the ABA puts its name and imprimatur
behind the underlying standard, it is hard to justify why that standard
should not be used, where appropriate, in court-based review of conduct,
malpractice and the like. Once adopted by the state, the weight of the
rules would be heavier. Without much discussion, state supreme courts
operate as if their norms, and their leadership, should be the dominant
voice in legal ethics. The Conference of Chief Justices has developed a
National Action Plan on Lawyer Conduct and Professionalism, and it is
clear that they identify their role as preeminent.' 70 The Conference of
Chief Justices undertook the national action plan to create "a strong, coordinated effort by state supreme courts to enhance their oversight of the
profession." 17 1 The state bars (and the ABA) see themselves as a vital
national leader of efforts to articulate norms of conduct. And the Model
Rules (and the state revisions) are the preeminent articulation of those
norms. 172
It is not surprising that the ABA revised the Scope section in the 2002
revisions to the Model Rules, recognizing that these rules, while not addressing sanctions in related contexts like litigation, nonetheless might be
relevant to that inquiry. The Scope section now includes a statement that
169. Id. For the legislative history, see ABA Center for Professional Responsibility,
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TFE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 20 (1987).

170. Implementation Plan for the Conference of Chief Justices' National Action Plan

on Lawyer Conduct and Professionalism (adopted August 2, 2001 by the Conference of
Chief Justices) available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/impl-plan.pdf; Resolution confirming
adoption available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/resolXIlLawyerConduct.html [hereinafter CCJ

Implementation Plan]. The report grew out of a March 1997 conference on Regulatory
Authority Over the Legal Profession and the Judiciary: The Responsibility of State Supreme Courts, id. at 7. See also Paula L. Hannaford, The National Action Plan on Lawyer
Conduct: A Role for the Judge in Improving Professionalism in the Legal System, 36 CT.
REV. 36 (1999).

171. CCJ Implementation Plan, supra note 168, at 1.
172. The dominant ABA role is not ordained from on high and reasonable minds have
questioned this role. When Prof. Andrew Kaufman suggested that the ABA get out of the
business of establishing rules for attorney conduct, some of the attendees of the 27th ABA
National Conference on Professional Responsibility were politely, but clearly, skeptical of
his position. Kaufman, supra note 75, at 4 (giving speech upon receipt of the Michael J.
Franck Award). For many, the ABA's role in articulating rules of conduct, and its showcase
ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, are the shining star in the ABA's crown.
"Since 1978, the Center has provided national leadership and vision in developing and
interpreting standards and scholarly resources in legal ethics, professional regulation, pro-

fessionalism and client protection mechanisms. Its devotion to assuring the highest standards of conduct by lawyers and judges and to enhancing the profession's role serving and
protecting the public interest is underscored by its vigilance to meet the challenges of an
evolving society." ABA Center for Prof'l Responsibility, Welcome Message, at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/home.html (Aug. 2, 2002).
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despite the caveats about the limits of the Rules, "[n]evertheless, since
the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of
conduct."' 7 3 While hardly a claim that the Rules should be the basis for
discipline in federal courts, it at least acknowledges that the Rules have
relevance in other contexts. The ABA has wisely made these adjustments, since few really believed that the ABA was disclaiming relevance
of their rules in non-disciplinary contexts. Yet, states have no power to
demand that federal courts be the enforcer of legal ethics when application of the rules (i.e. remedy) will impede what the federal judges perceive as the interests of the federal courts.174
The incompleteness and arguably limited scope of the Model Rules was
one of the reasons the American Law Institute ("ALI") chose to devote
fifteen years toward drafting a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers.1 75 The ALL intended the Restatement to address the full range of
conduct issues, including formation of the lawyer-client relationship, the
duty of confidentiality, work product issues, conflicts of interest, fiduciary
and agency obligations, fees and obligations to non-clients.1 76 In terms of
relative influence, however, the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers has not been embraced to fill the gap. As Chart III indicates, the
federal courts cite the restatement at a significantly lower rate than the
courts cite the state or model versions of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The restatement has not yet become a significant competitor with,
or source to complement, the Rules of Professional Conduct.1 77 This may
173.

The revised provision states:
Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a
lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty
has been breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in
pending litigation. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers
and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the
purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing
parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of
a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's
violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of
conduct. (Emphasis added.)

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr, Scope [20] (2002).

174. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 118, at § 2.6 (analyzing judicial application of
lawyer codes).
175.

RESTATEMENT THIRD, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS xxi-xxii (2000) [hereinaf-

ter Restatement]. See generally Ted Schneyer, The ALI's Restatement and the ABA's
Model Rules: Rivals or Complements?, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 25, 26 (1993) (While "the law of
lawyering is in disarray, it does not necessarily follow that ALI intervention is a good
idea.").
176. James Podgers, Critics Fear Impact of Ethics Restatement: ALl's New Standards for
Lawyers' Behavior Could be Basis for Malpractice Claims, 81 A.B.A. J. 34 (1995).
177. See Schneyer, supra note 175, at 27 (expressing concern about "the potential rivalry between restatement and ethics codes for the attention of judges and other decision
makers.").
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occur because more federal courts give at least nodding recognition to the
local rules, which typically direct them to the state rules of conduct. It
may also be because some provisions of the Restatement either conflict
with the prevailing rules or depart from existing case law. 178 Whatever
the reason, it is fair to conclude that the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers has had relatively little influence in federal court practice.
This suggests that the Rules of Professional Conduct (both state versions
and the model) are the most important prescriptive generalizations to
which the federal courts give initial attention when addressing attorney
79

conduct issues. 1

CHART III
FEDERAL COURT CITATION TO MODEL RULES, STATE RULES,
MODEL CODE
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178. See Lawrence J. Latto. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: A View
From the Trenches, 26 HOiFSTRA L. Rrv. 697 (1998); Richard C. Stanley. The Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyer Regulation Coming of Age, 48 LA. B.J. 22, 24

(2000).
179. PLAYING By THE RULES, supra note 7, at 77 (discussing decision-making by entrenched generalization).
180. The citation pattern for the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and state
versions of the Rules of Professional Conduct were prepared by running a search for cases
that cited "rules of professional conduct" and a search for cases that cited "model rules of
professional conduct" and then subtracting the lower number of cases citing to "model
rules" from those citing to "rules" generally. A review of the 328 cases from 1989 and 1996
revealed only one case that did not involve the ABA code. (For those who are curious,
there is a pharmacist's Rules of Professional Conduct.) It was impossible to duplicate this
process in order to determine how many times the court cited to state codes of professional
responsibility because a search for "code of professional responsibility" brought up not just
cases that cited to the model code and the state codes but also various business and other
codes of professional responsibility.
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The Federal and State Interests and Institutional Competence

We need to add into the mix some additional dimensions of the state
and federal courts' interests in regulating attorney conduct. While there
appears to be a dominant national legal culture in the United States, we
still have state-based regulation. We could describe that state-based regulation as the archaic detritus of an older system of federalism.18 Our
preference for state-based regulation more likely reflects the notion that
fine-tuning at the state and local level is an important step in thoughtful
82
and effective regulation.
As noted above, the Conference of Chief Justices has continuously promoted its vision of the strong, dominant state role in the regulation of
attorneys. A full development of the value of state-based regulation of
attorneys is beyond the scope of this article. It is safe to conclude, however, that the control of the legal profession will not be wrested away
from the state supreme courts without significant trauma.
The federal courts' selective involvement in establishing norms of conduct suggests two core concerns: efficiency and integrity of the judicial
process. The judge's dominant task is to resolve the dispute before him
or her. Faced with burgeoning dockets and increasingly complex cases,
judges inevitably engage in time triage.18 3 Called "task interference" in
the language of psychology, judges allocate less time to managing attorney conduct. 184 The federal judges appear to embrace what can be called
a minimal encroachment approach to attorney regulation. Federal judges
typically engage in that amount of regulation minimally necessary to
achieve their goal of efficient and fair resolution of the case at hand.
Some judges have a more expansive view of their role, but that does not
appear to be the dominant view.
Sometimes federal judges will enforce an ethical norm for the benefit
of the judicial process in general, even if the benefit does not directly flow
to the case at hand. For example, courts-rather than litigants-are
likely to raise a question of whether a lawyer has failed to cite directly
adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction.18 5 This is a fairly precise
rule, yet it has been addressed in over 50 published federal court opinions.18 6 In most cases, the court raises the question itself, primarily because the duty arises when counsel has failed through due diligence to
discover authority helpful to the opposing counsel's case. (Who wants to
181. As Prof. Benjamin H. Barton has noted, it wasn't until the late 19th century that
state supreme courts established themselves as having inherent judicial authority to regulate the practice of law. See Barton, supra note 3, at 1173.
182. The principle of subsidiarity captures this concept.
183. See generally Tobias, supra note 10.
184. Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence,76 S. CAL. L. REv. 603-06 (Mar. 2003).
185. MoDEiL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcTr, R. 3.3(a)(2) (2002) ("A lawyer shall not ...
knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by
opposing counsel.").
186. See FED[RAL LAW OF AYI'ORNEY CONDUCI, supra note 11, at § 811.02 and cases

cited therein.
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go before a court and say "sanction the other side for not correcting my
sloppy or nonexistent research . . . ."). By the time the court raises the
issue, the precedent has been discovered (usually by the court's own initiative), so any dilution or taint on the trial process has been reduced or
eliminated. But courts appear willing to sanction an attorney, at least
through criticism in the written opinion, in order to send a signal both to
the attorney involved and others. Fact-finding is de mininus because the
written briefs offer the requisite proof. More serious sanctions for intentional violation of the obligation to cite directly contrary authority are
typically limited to cases in which the lawyer (or the lawyer's office) was
involved in the development of the prior87precedent, allowing a strong
inference of knowledge of the precedent.
The federal courts' response to the failure to cite contrary authority
reflects both a strong belief in the integrity of the judicial process and one
example of the obligation of lawyers as officers of the court. It makes
sense that federal judges want lawyers to adhere to this ethical precept
because it increases the likelihood of an outcome consistent with the law.
A second federal interest would likely be procedural consistency. As
explained above, even consistent rules do not necessarily lead to consistent outcomes.' 8 8 The most common way to get greater consistency is
through greater clarity and rigidity in the rules and a reduction of discretion. And as discussed above, attorney conduct issues lend themselves to
greater, not lesser, discretion.
B.

THE INTERPRETIVE PROCESS AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION

1. Primary Discretion on Rules
We are left with the fact that the translation of state rules of conduct
into federal court practice requires judicial discretion. Judicial discretion
is a vast and complex topic.' 89 Discretion has been the dominant norm in
judicial control of litigation. For example, judicial discretion in Rule 11
was not "a mere by-product of the drafting process, but rather was a favored means to achieve procedural goals."' 190 Similarly, judicial discretion has been a central feature of the pre-trial reforms. 19'
The application of a rule requires multiple steps that implicate discretion: an analysis of what rule (or standard) applies, fact-finding to see if
187. See, e.g., Velazquez v. Figueroa Gomez, 783 F. Supp. 31, 35 (D.P.R. 1991) (permitting defense attorneys given 20 days to explain why they did not cite adverse precedent
that lawyers had litigated); Jorgenson v. County of Volusia, 625 F. Supp. 1543, 1547 (D. Fla.
1986) (analyzing DR 7-102 and Model Rule 3.3(a)(2), court imposed $500 fine; "-The Court
finds it reprehensible that plaintiffs' counsel ...

omitted Bellanca and Del Percio from the

supporting memorandum of law, especially, when he personally represented respondents
in Del Percio.").
188. See infra Part 111.
189. See generally Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHITS SERIOUSLY 31-33 (1977) (discuss-

ing strong and weak discretion); Fletcher, supra note 6.
190. Armour, supra note 6, at 514.
191. See Resnick, supra note 140, at 195-214 (discussing the durability of discretion at
the expense of uniformity).
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the circumstances of the case are covered by the rule, and a decision
about remedies.t 92 The first stage of determining what rule or standard
applies has been the subject of formal debate over the past ten years and
is discussed at length above. Judges in some circumstances have "primary
discretion," the ability to choose the rules or norms that will apply to
resolve the issue at hand. 193 Primary discretion takes place when the
state version of the rules of responsibility does not clearly address the
issue at hand. In those cases, the rules themselves offer relatively less
guidance and are not sufficiently clear to significantly constrain the lawyer's or the judge's judgments. 194 The judge then turns to other norms or
standards to resolve the issue.
Even if a court looks to a particular Rule of Conduct, a rule does not,
and cannot, determine its own weight. 195 With Rules of Professional
Conduct, this plays out in two forms. First, precedent plays some role in
interpreting the rules of conduct, but for many issues the court simply
offers its own understanding of the issue without significantly delving into
precedent, or relies on federal precedent. The remedy stage offers the
second example of the indeterminate weight of the ethics rules. As discussed above, the rules themselves give no remedy, and it is the remedy
that largely determines the weight of the rule. For remedy purposes,
other values such as efficiency may have greater weight.
2.

Discretion Through Fact-FindingProcess

Discretion also operates through the judge's fact-finding power. 196
Fact-finding is a huge burden. Judges have at least two decision-points in
the factual interpretation stage. The judge can simply refuse to acknowledge the factual issue in any formal fashion. Because attorney conduct
issues in litigation are usually ancillary to the merits of the underlying
suit, cognitive theory would predict that judges would allocate their time
to the primary task of deciding cases. 197 This "parsimonious strategy" to
192. See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 64, at 1192. Alexander and Sherwin use the

provocative language of rules "lying" to emphasize the ways in which rules do not constrain in ways that are implied in the text. See also PLAYING BY TIE RULES, supra note 7,

at 8 ("The strength of a rule resides not so much in a rule's logical status or linguistic
meaning as in the conditions surrounding its applicability, acceptance, and enforcement.").
As Prof. Schauer notes, the distinction between the factual predicate and the consequent
(what happens if the factual predicate is present) is not always sharp. Id. at 23.
193. George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 747-48 (1986).

194. See generally Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 64, at 1217.
195. Schauer, supra note 2, at 919-20 ("Whether a rule that declares itself nonoverridable or absolute will be treated as such by its addressees, appliers, or interpreters is an
empirical fact nondeterminable by the rule itself, regardless of the language within the
rule.").
196. See John Bell, Discretionary Decision-Making: A Jurisprudential View, in THiE
UsEs or-DISCRETION 89, 102 (Keith Hawkins, ed. 1992) ("By plotting all the constraints,

legal and otherwise, within the institutional context, we come to understand the full scope
of the autonomy which the individual possesses.").
197. Hirsch, supra note 181, at 605 ("When courts or other lawmaking bodies have no
choice but to deal with multiple issues simultaneously, a theory of cognitive jurisprudence
again anticipates that they will apply themselves unevenly, the lion's share of attention
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simply ignore the conduct is a "decision by default, a kind of heuristic."198
We certainly have reason to think that simply ignoring the issue is a fairly
common first level response by judges. 199 Lawyers have noted this phenomenon and have complained about judges who ignore perceived
200
misconduct.
Alternatively, a judge can acknowledge the issue-essentially tell the
lawyers to cut it out-but not engage in the fact-finding necessary to establish an ethics violation. Many ethical issues in litigation turn on "fact
20 1
finding about motive, which is the hardest kind of fact-finding to do.
Finding facts is not a mechanical process; it involves identification and
allocation of values, all of which take time and energy. 20 2 As a result,
there is a tendency to simply tell the lawyers to stop the conduct, but not
engage in fact-finding necessary to support a sanction.
3. Discretion to Comment
Many judges do delve into ethical issues that are raised in the courtroom and take the time to address the issues in reported decisions. Perhaps the issue was unavoidable, dispositive, involved compelling or
egregious facts, raised roles issues of importance to the judge or drew an
emotional response from the judge. 20 3 A judge's personal experience
with the particular ethical issue may also help explain how the judge regoing to primary tasks."); C. K.
IN FEDERAL DISTRICr

ROWLAND & ROB-RT A. CAR', POLITICS AND JUDGMENT
COURTs 5 (University Press of Kansas 1996) ("At the most simplis-

tic level, the function of U.S. trial judges is to enforce legal norms by resolving individual
disputes.").
198. Hirsch, supra note 181, at 603 (citing Steffen Huck & Jorg Oechssler, Informational Cascades in the Laboratory: Do 7hey Occur for the Right Reasons?, 21 J. EcoN.
PSYCHOL. 661 (2000)); Amos Tversky & Eldar Shafir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamnics of Deferred Decision, 3 Psyciioi. Sci. 358 (1992).

199. See Isom, supra note 109.
200. See, e.g., James A. George, The "Rambo Problem": Is Mandatory CLE the Way

Back to Atticus?, 62 LA. L. REv. 467, 489 (2002).
201. When asked what his reaction would be when an ethical issue arose, one state
court judge responded:
There is no good way to describe what my reaction would be. My first reaction would always be frustration. And the frustration was two-fold. First,
and primarily I must say, was not an ethical, was not a frustration about ethics, it was a frustration about the activity of the lawyer creating some kind of
a side issue that I now had to spend time to do fact finding on, or at least deal
with in some fashion, typically in a form of fact finding, because these typically were always fact-driven issues. "Did you disclose this stuff, didn't you
disclose this. If you didn't disclose, why didn't you." It was a fact bound
issue. So my first response was, damn it, there is a fact issue here that now is
a side issue that I have to decide. I've got a million things on my plate; I don't
need to deal with this. And I frankly don't want to because there is no intellectual content to it. It's all just pure fact finding and not only fact finding
about activity, but fact finding about motive which is the hardest kind of factfinding to do. [02-SBI.
202. See ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 197, at 3.
203. Hirsch, supra note 181, at 609-11.
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acts to the issue.20 4 We can only speculate.
We know that the written trail left by reported decisions is an incomplete picture. As explored in previous work, 20 5 factors such as efficiency,20 6 judicial collegiality and reputation as a fair-minded judge,20 7
concern for the reputation of the lawyer 20 8 or the dignity 20 9 of the lawyer
might all push a judge to elect not to comment on attorney conduct.
Some judges presumably have greater tolerance for the adversarial obligation of lawyers. 2 10 The writing process itself might cause the judge's
204. This is an important empirical question that needs to be studied. Theory would
suggest that a judge's personal experience shapes a judge's willingness to address an issue.
See H.W. Perry, DECIDING 'ro DECIDE 260-63 (1991); Hirsch, supra note 87, at 1362.
205. See generally McMorrow, Gardina & Ricciardone, supra note 159.
206. See generally Herbert Jacob, The Governance of Trial Judges, 31 L. & Soc'y REV.
3 (1997); Zacharias & Green, supra note 62, at 1360 ("Efficient allocation of judicial resources militates in favor of district courts confining themselves to adjudicating questions
of professional misconduct that can be resolved without resort to an independent factfinding mechanism.").
207. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003) (summarizing theories of influences on judicial
decision making); In re Voorhees, 739 S.W.2d 178, 187 (Mo. 1987) (without Canon 3B(3)
judges may be tempted to avoid "rocking the boat," but "not every failure to inform about
well-publicized misbehavior of a fellow judge" is misconduct); Leslie W. Abramson, The
Judge's Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct By Other Judges and Lawyers and Its Effect On
Judicial Independence, 25 HOFsrRA L. REV. 751, 779-80 (1997) ("Understandably, what
judge would want the reputation of a snitch?"). Reputation is a multifaceted subject. a full
exploration of which is well beyond the scope of this article. Reputation concerns may
include a desire to avoid controversy if the judge is subject to reelection, a desire for influence in the legal academy, a desire for influence in the local or state bar, and the like.
Reputation may have the more genial goal of serving as confirmation that the judge is
actually a fair-minded and fair-acting arbiter.
208. Judges may agree with Justice Stevens' factual assessment that "[diespite the
changes that have taken place at the bar since I left the active practice 20 years ago, I still
believe that most lawyers are wise enough to know that their most precious asset is their
professional reputation." Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 413 (1990) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also SHAPIRO, supra note 152, at 425 (describing
situation in which lawyer asked for conference concerning a conflict issue; judges' response
to opposing counsel "You guys have got to be crazy. You're going to have a terrible opinion against you." The attorneys withdrew.).
As one federal district court judge described, "I think it's potentially a career-ruining
decision when a judge refers something to a professional conduct committee or institutes
disciplinary procedures or even names a lawyer in an opinion in which the lawyer is cited
for a potential ethical violation. So I tend to, to do it very rarely and only if I felt the
violation was most serious and intentional rather than inadvertent that I would likely consider it an ethical violation." [03-FDI.
209. One federal district court judge stated that the judge would never publicly embarrass a lawyer. To publicly embarrass a lawyer shows "a lack of respect. Respect has to be
mutual." (08-FD).
210. Two federal judges interviewed about their views of attorney conduct reflect the
range of tolerance. One federal district court judge stated that "there are circumstances
where your duty to your client, it seems to me, requires that you approach the border of
the box-requires it." [04-FD].
A federal appeals court judge had a much more critical assessment of the adversarial
paradigm. After describing the problem as a "disturbing level of distortion of law and fact,
misdescribing cases, omissions, outright misdescription. It's getting worse at a rate of
about 5% per year," the judge went on to criticize judges who are too sympathetic of the
adversarial pressures. "[S]ome of my colleagues resist even criticizing much less imposing
sanctions under R. 38 of the App Rules. Their argument is that the lawyer is supposed to
zealously represent the client-if they come close to the zone or a little over, well .... Or
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temper to cool. 2 11 Appellate judges may need to garner the votes of the

other judges on the panel. 2t 2 While this subject requires much more detailed examination and empirical research, for our purposes it is sufficient
to note that judges have ample reasons not to comment on a lawyer's
conduct in written opinions.
4.

Secondary Discretion Through Limited Review

In the area of attorney conduct, federal judges also have what has been
termed secondary discretion: the judge's decisions are accorded a presumption of correctness that will be overturned only if the discretion has
been abused. 2 13 Many attorney conduct issues are fact bound and
21 4 This secondary disthereby shielded from significant appellate review.
cretion is particularly strong because appeals courts rarely have an opportunity to apply even this abuse of discretion standard because of delays in
appellate review. In the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a series of
opinions holding that motions to disqualify are not immediately appealable. 215 Since 1985, attorney disqualification issues have received appellate review only in the rare circumstances in which a writ of mandamus
has been issued or the issue has been preserved and reviewed along with
the appeal on the merits.
Limiting appellate review to mandamus or those cases that are resolved on the merits and then appealed had two interesting effects. First,
for conflict of interest and advocate-witness issues, appellate analysis
slowed to a trickle, forcing current courts to refer over and over again to
older decisions as they analyzed whether disqualification was appropriate. Many of these commonly cited appellate decisions reflect the state of
legal ethics in the 1970s and early 1980s, using the language of the Model
Code. The result is what Professor Ronald Rotunda has called the "death
they say, 'I've seen much worse in other cases' so if we didn't sanction then, we shouldn't
now." [1-FAI
211. See Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics,70 U. Ciii. L. REv. 751, 754 (2003);
David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICs 509, 514 (2001) ("An ethical judge must demand of herself that she identify and
understand her own biases and how they affect her reaction to a case. Writing opinions has
an important role in this effort.*).
212. A federal appeals court judge described the dynamic in this way: "Some judges are
reflexively reluctant to criticize, much less sanction. Some are more aggressive. The reality is that if even one judge resists, no matter how offensive I judge the matter, nothing
happens. The fact that t or 2 are unenthusiastic about pursuing it effectively exercises a
veto over action." [I-FA]
213. Christie, supra note 193, at 749. See generally Bell, supra note 21, at 94.
214. See ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 197, at 3 ("[T]he policy-making power inherent
in fact-finding maximizes district judges' influence over the authoritative allocation of values because it is virtually immune from appellate review.").
215. Richardson-Merrill Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) (disqualification in civil
cases not subject to immediate appeal); Flanagan v. United States. 465 U.S. 259, 260 (1984)
(disqualification of defense counsel in criminal case not immediately appealable). Similarly, imposition of sanctions against an attorney under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) was not a final
decision subject to appeal. Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 207 (1999)
("The effective congruence of interests between clients and attorneys counsels against
treating attorneys like other nonparties for purposes of appeal.").
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of precedent" in conflicts analysis in federal courts.216
This severely limited appellate review also arguably skews the conflicts
analysis when the rare case does go up on appeal. By the time the case is
decided on the merits and appealed, a successful motion to disqualify is
often old news. It takes the unusual case in which the losing party also
lost the motion to disqualify earlier in the lawsuit. 2 17 Those rare cases

that preserve and pursue the disqualification of counsel have a huge burden. When reviewing the case, appellate courts appear very reluctant to
overturn the motion to disqualify, presumably because this raises very
challenging remedy issues. If the motion to disqualify were erroneously
granted to the party that lost the litigation below, the make-whole remedy would be to reverse the decision and order a new trial with the disqualified counsel. But absent indication that the merits have been skewed
by the change in counsel, courts would be imposing huge transaction
costs by ordering a new trial because of a collateral, seemingly procedural
issue that did not affect the merits. 218 The "affirmance effect"-the fact
that 80% of all federal civil cases, both published and unpublished, are

affirmed-gives the original court decision to disqualify (or not) powerful
2 19
momentum.

Finally, if the underlying merits of the case have been resolved, appeals
courts have been reluctant to allow attorneys to appeal from published
criticism of the lawyer unless there is a formal sanction imposed. 220 The
net effect, again, is to give the trial judge enormous, largely unreviewable,
discretion.
5.

Natural Resistance to Limiting Discretion
Judges generally resist efforts to limit their discretion-particularly in

216. Ronald J. Rotunda, Sister Act: Conflicts of Interest With Sister Corporations, t J.
INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 215, 225 (1996).

217. As a practical matter, if a motion to disqualify is granted, then substitute counsel is
now in control. Even if substitute counsel lost on the merits, it is unlikely that they would
claim that the outcome would have been different with substitute-better-counsel. See
SHAPIRO, supra note 152, at 420-28 (describing phenomenon of and consequences that flow
from filing a motion to disqualify).
218. Collateral damage from motions to disqualify is huge for the losing side as well.
See Rotunda, supra note 214, at 272 ("The threat of disqualification can impose substantial
costs on a law firm and the client it represents. It protracts the litigation and increases its
cost, exerts extra pressure on the client to settle the matter rather than defend a disqualification motion or find new legal counsel, and if the lawyers are disqualified, burdens the
client to find and prepare a new law firm to represent it.")
219. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 150 (2002).

220. In many jurisdictions, the criticism of an attorney in a written opinion is not appealable once the underlying merits have been resolved. See, e.g., In re Williams, 156 F.3d
86, 92 (1st Cir. 1998) ("A jurist's derogatory comments about a lawyer's conduct, without
more, do not constitute a sanction" and consequently are not appealable.); Clark Equip.
Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., 972 F.2d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1992) ("an attorney may not appeal
from an order that finds misconduct but does not result in monetary liability, despite the
potential reputational effects."). But see Walker v. City of Mesquite, 129 F.3d 831, 832 (5th
Cir. 1997) (attorney may appeal a public reprimand even when no monetary sanctions have
been imposed).
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this area of managing the cases that come before them. 22 1 The very
raison d'etre of federal judges is to exercise discretion. The only way to
stop them from exercising their inherent function is to strip them of the
discretionary power.
The experience under Rule 11 is illustrative. Rule 11 prohibits filing a
pleading, motion or other paper that is filed for an improper purpose or
lacks a factual or legal foundation. 22 2 In 1983, Rule 11 was substantially
strengthened to not just empower, but to command federal judges to
sanction. 2 23 This turned Rule 11 into a litigation weapon. 224 After 10
years experience under this mandatory Rule, the Judicial Conference
amended Rule 11 to return significant discretion to judges to impose
sanctions. The changes offered few guidelines, "creating in effect the absolute right not to sanction. '22 5 The rule drafting process was unable to
give more specific content to the rule. Judicial discretion, once again,
became the preferred method to achieve the underlying goal of limiting
frivolous litigation.
In some respects, it perhaps shows disrespect for judges to attempt to
constrain their discretion too much, especially in areas involving what is
fairly characterized as controlling the proceeding before them. It demeans the very quality that one seeks in the judge. On the other hand,
lawyers have a deep interest in having notice of the standards that will be
applied to them.
6.

Problems With Discretion

Of course, there can be problems with judicial discretion. Abuse of
discretion is the typical standard for reviewing trial court imposition of
sanctions for attorney misconduct. 2 26 We do not have evidence that this
discretion is systematically abused. But because of the absence of appellate review, we also do not have evidence that the discretion is wisely
used.
We know that discretion always carries with it the possibility of abuse.
The broad discretion for attorney conduct issues understandably scares
the DOJ. They want to eliminate the possibility of abuse-from their
perspective. The DOJ has been successful in whittling away at judicial
221. See Stephen B. Burbank, Inplementing ProceduralChange: Who, How, Why, and
When?, 49 ALA. L. REv. 221, 238 (1997) (Federal trial judges "do not react well to rules
that limit their discretion."'); Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial
and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 At-A. L.
REV. 133, 199-200 (1997) (Federal trial judges are "strongly attached to their own individual authority" to manage cases.).
222. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
223. Brown, supra note 98, at 1566-67; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and
Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475 (1991).
224. Brown, supra note 98, at 1567-69.
225. Armour, supra note 6, at 507.
226. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991) (applying abuse of discretion
standard in reviewing District Court's sanction under inherent powers): Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (using abuse of discretion standard when reviewing Rule II sanctions).
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discretion in a few key areas, such as successfully convincing the First
Circuit that the district court exceeded its rulemaking authority to the
extent that the local rules incorporate a state rule limiting subpoenas on
defense counsel in the grand jury context.22 7 The DOJ has gone to states
with ethics interpretations that impair DOJ activities and has had at least
one success in getting the state to change the ethics rule. 228 Discretion
can be curbed on the edges by strategic attacks.
Some might be concerned about this generally broad discretion because political ideology can play a role in decision-making. But the impact of ideology on a judge's view of attorney conduct is not obvious. 229
Critical legal studies critiques of preferences for the existing power structure do not necessarily assist us in analyzing the allocation of discretion in
regulating attorney conduct in federal court practice. The impact of race
and gender may be evident in individual cases, but it is again unclear
what role it has in determining the allocation of power in this area. Law
and economics offer the more obvious assistance by giving analytical support for the idea that judges will naturally align themselves with approaches that give them maximum flexibility to advance individual or
institutional efficiency.
Lawyers presumably want to be free from the uncertainty of unpredictable outcomes. We understand intuitively, and more recently from empirical data, that judges are not immune from many of the cognitive
biases that affect other mere mortals. 230 Judges are prone to hindsight
bias: after the bad consequences have occurred, people may overestimate
the predictability of the bad event. 2 31 But most judges were also practicing attorneys, which presumably would give them greater empathy for the
lawyer's task. 232 There is some reason to think that greater empathy still
may not minimize the gaps in perceptions. Judges are prone to egocentric
biases, such as overestimating their abilities in comparison to others.2 33
For example, in Prof. Theodore Eisenberg's study of bankruptcy judges
and lawyers, "[e]ach group tends to overstate the merits of its professional performance compared to the other group's perception of that performance. ' 234 For example, judges viewed themselves as fine-tuning
227. Stern v. United States Dist. Ct., 214 F.3d 4, 21 (1st Cir. 2000) (local rule requiring
judicial preapproval of subpoenas to defense counsel is not applicable to federal prosecutors because it interferes with federal grand jury system).
228. Peter Wong, Court OKs Exception to Lawyers' Deceit Rule, STATESMAN JOURNAl
(Jan. 30, 2002), available at http://www.avoiceforchildren.com/documents/lie_cheatsteal/
OREGON % 20STATE % 20BAR % 20NOW % 20LEGALLY %20DECEIDFUL.htm. See
also Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1273 (2004).

229. Legal realists broke the story on this subject. See generally Felix S. Cohen, Tran-

scendental Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 CowUM. L. REV. 809, 846 (1935).
230. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001).
231. Id. at 799-805.

232. Levels of empathy are an interesting research question.
233. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 230, at 811-16.
234. Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases,

72

WASiI.

U. L.Q. 979, 981 (1994).
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compensation more than lawyers perceive this occurring. 235 On the flip
side, lawyers perceived themselves as complying with fee guidelines far
more than judges perceive compliance. 236 And many decisions about attorney conduct in litigation are made "under uncertain, time-pressured
conditions" that may "encourage reliance on cognitive shortcuts that
sometimes cause illusions of judgment." 237 One path to minimizing such
heuristics is through "increased attention and greater deliberation"-the
very commodity that judges are carefully marshalling and jealously
guarding. 238 We must be cautious, however, about overemphasizing
239
these heuristics, or the public policy implications derived therefrom.
Because we do not have evidence of systematic abuse of discretion-or
intolerable levels of cognitive bias-it is quite understandable that courts
perceive that the benefits of discretion outweigh the risks. Once again,
all systems push toward flexibility for judges in addressing attorney
conduct.
C.

No

EASY CURE FOR THIS PROBLEM

Lawyers are left with the challenge of anticipating how a federal court
will react to a particular ethical dilemma. There will be no easy cure for
the challenge inherent in a federal system. The analysis above demonstrates that even if federal courts consistently use state rules of conduct
(vertical uniformity), there are multiple steps in the decision-making process that incorporate significant judicial discretion. At heart, these interpretive differences will arise because the norm creators in this context
(the state supreme courts) are not the norm enforcers. Federal judges are
one step removed from the rules and have a long history of articulating
the values behind the rules as applied in their courtroom.
Even if federal courts create targeted uniform rules to address recurring issues in federal court practice (horizontal uniformity), the inherent
limit of rules and the absence of appellate review means it is unlikely that
235. Id. at 985.
236. Id. at 987; see also Ian Weinstein, Don't Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive
Bias in Legal Decisionmaking,9 CiINICAL L. REV. 783 (2003) (analyzing lawyer and client
perceptions).
237. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 230, at 783.
238. Id. at 819-820 ("[elven with greater resources, judges will still resort to cognitive
shortcuts."). Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich advocate three methods to minimize heuristics: adopting multiple perspectives when making decisions, limiting heuristics to circumstances in which they are most appropriately used, and reducing reliance on judgments that
are particularly prone to distortion. Id. at 822-25.
One method to temper egocentric bias is to provide multiple judicial appeals. Id. at 82829. When a judge criticizes an attorney in a written opinion (i.e. shames the lawyer), but
imposes no additional sanction, that written criticism is alone not subject to appeal, taking
away one technique to check this egocentric bias. In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86 (1st Cir.

1998).
239. Cf Samuel Issacharoff, Behavioral Decision Theory in the Court of Public Law, 87

CORNELL L. Ritv. 671 (2002). In particular, -the literature has had relatively little to say
about the role of institutional mechanisms that may buffer or even neutralize defective
heuristics that can dominate individual decisionmaking." Id. at 671-72.
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there will be a national body of case law to give meaning to rules that
might be adopted.
What has emerged is a delicate, ongoing balance of competing interests
that is driven by a minimal encroachment approach that acknowledges
the state supreme courts' strong interest, but gives room for the autonomy interests of the federal courts. This is an acceptable policy result, not
because the current situation is good, but because the alternatives will not
be better and might make the situation worse.
Very targeted and selective drafting of specific rules to address commonly-occurring situations may offer some modest help. But the situations amenable to precise rules are also situations that might better be
addressed in the rules of procedure. For example, there may be value in
setting out in a text how lawyers should proceed when there is accidental
disclosure of privileged information, the limits of prosecutorial contact
with represented persons during investigations, and the specific requirements for subpoenas on defense counsel. The fact that these are recurring situations and are woven into the underlying procedural
requirements suggests that these issues may be better addressed under
240
the rules of civil or criminal procedure.
IV.

THE UTILITY OF RULES: MINIMAL
ENCROACHMENT APPROACH

So far, federal courts have been unable to develop a rule-based resolution to the issue of which rules should govern attorney conduct in federal
court practice. The effort to create rules of attorney conduct in federal
court practice, while likely to be futile, has had some important positive
effects. While the Rules of Professional Conduct are not as deeply entrenched in federal courts as they are in the state regulatory apparatus,
this does not mean that the rules are without value. Rules foster "predictability, reliability, and certainty," but to varying degrees. 24 1 The very
fact that the issue was raised might have been the impetus for a few district courts embracing a local rule of dynamic conformity. That advances
the goal of predictability (at the expense of the highest level of consistency for those with a national practice).
Over the past ten years, this debate has also sharpened our understanding of the role of federal courts in developing litigation ethics. Rules are
a device for allocating power.2 42 Representatives from the Conference of
State Chief Justices have been involved in the federal courts' analysis of
this issue and have been clear about their preference for a minimal encroachment approach by federal courts. The rich scholarly discussion has
240. See generally Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking,
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (1999).
241. PILAYING By -rii RULES, supra note 7, at 98, 102.
242. PLAYING By THE RULES, supra note 7, at 98 ("If rules function in the service of a
division of responsibility among agents or institutions, if they service jurisdiction-apportioning roles, then rule-based decision-making can patrol the boundaries between jurisdictions in a way that no other decision-making procedure can.").
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sharpened our understanding of the role of judges in shaping ethical
norms.
The debate over what attorney conduct rules apply has also sharpened
our understanding of the field of litigation ethics. The early Rules Committee study revealed that conflict of interest, contact with represented
persons and advocate as witness are the three most litigated ethics issues
in federal court practice. By putting these issues on the radar screen,
courts may become a bit more thoughtful about the policy differences
and choices.
The failed effort to create uniform rules has also encouraged dialogue.
The McDade Amendment and the power of national rule-making have
forced the DOJ to the negotiating table with certain states. The DOJ's
multiple efforts to make an end run around the issues by going directly to
Congress have been unsuccessful because of the amazing and shifting values this issue raises.
This process is also causing some to rethink the role of the American
Bar Association in promulgating rules of conduct. Andrew Kaufman has
been using this process to argue that the ABA's dominant role in crafting
standards of professional conduct is no longer appropriate and that the
power of rule-making should be centered in the Conference of Chief Justices and the Judicial Conference, with the ABA functioning in an advisory capacity.

2 43

V. CONCLUSION
It is no secret that we have multiple strains on our state-based system
of attorney regulation. The debate over rules of conduct for federal court
practice has helped us understand the limited and focused interest of federal courts.
Although federal courts are unlikely to create comprehensive rules of
conduct, they may yet develop a handful of rules. Even without a few
focused rules, we recognize that the grip of the states has loosened.
States are one important actor in the law governing lawyers. They are not
the only actor, however. In federal litigation, the federal courts inevitably will be the dominant actor in determining the norms, the remedy and
the role that federal courts are willing to assume in the mosaic of attorney
regulation.
It is appropriate to end this article with a critical caveat. This analysis
is based on inferences from the failed effort to create at least some uniform rules of attorney conduct applicable to federal court practice. This
analysis, unfortunately, is informed largely by anecdotal evidence about
judges' concerns. We know relatively little about litigation realities, and
even less about the systemic patterns of how judges deal with issues of
attorney conduct. 244 We have much more to learn.
243. Kaufman, supra note 75, at 1.
244. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 217, at 148 ("A major point of this Article
is that all of us know very little about litigation realities. The realm of unknowns is vast.").
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